Litigating Women: The Path to Intermediate Scrutiny in American Law by Epperson, Sarah Claye
LITIGATING WOMEN: THE PATH TO INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY IN 
AMERICAN LAW 
 
 
An Undergraduate Research Scholars Thesis 
by 
SARAH CLAYE EPPERSON 
 
 
Submitted to the Undergraduate Research Scholars program at  
Texas A&M University 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the designation as an 
 
 
UNDERGRADUATE RESEARCH SCHOLAR 
 
 
Approved by Research Advisors:                 Dr. Katherine Unterman 
Dr. Randy Gordon 
 
 
May 2018 
 
 
Major: History 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................................. 1 
Literature Review.............................................................................................................. 1 
Thesis Statement ............................................................................................................... 2 
Theoretical Framework ..................................................................................................... 2 
Project Description............................................................................................................ 2 
DEDICATION  ............................................................................................................................. 4 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS  ........................................................................................................... 5 
INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................ 6 
CHAPTERS 
I. “THE TRADITION” AND RATIONAL BASIS ..................................................... 12 
Muller v. Oregon: Progressive Reform Qualifies as Rational Basis .................. 12 
Women, Labor and Law until 1948 .................................................................... 24 
Goesaert v. Cleary: Sexist Lobbying Disguised as Rational Basis .................... 26 
II. “THE TURNING POINT” AND RUTH BADER GINSBURG .............................. 37
III. “THIRSTY BOYS” AND INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY .................................... 64
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................... 78 
BIBLIOGRAPHY ....................................................................................................................... 82 
1 
ABSTRACT 
Litigating Women: The Path to Intermediate Scrutiny in American Law 
Sarah Claye Epperson 
Department of History 
Texas A&M University 
Research Advisor: Dr. Katherine Unterman 
Department of History 
Texas A&M University 
Research Advisor: Dr. Randy Gordon 
School of Law 
Texas A&M University 
Literature Review 
Extant scholarship explains the significance of Muller v. Oregon (1908); Goesaert v. 
Cleary (1948); Reed v. Reed (1971); Frontiero v. Richardson (1973); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld 
(1975); and Craig v. Boren (1976) as sex-based discrimination equal protection challenges. 
Sometimes, the Equal Rights Amendment is discussed to contextualize the cases from the 
Seventies. Additionally, many researchers have explored the similarities between the legal 
statuses of women and racial minorities, especially African Americans. The discipline of history 
has catalogued women’s rights during the Twentieth century, and legal experts have explained 
the implications of relevant Supreme Court. However, a cohesive narrative of the jurisprudence 
leading to the pronouncement of the intermediate scrutiny test does not exist; this work fills the 
gap in scholarship. 
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Thesis Statement 
 The intermediate scrutiny test used by the Supreme Court to evaluate sex-based 
discrimination claims was developed throughout the Twentieth century as female litigators and 
activists brought cases to the Court, urging the justices to consider sex as a class protected from 
discrimination by employing the equal protection clause.  
 
 
Theoretical Framework 
 This work will examine the development of the intermediate scrutiny test used by the 
Supreme Court when evaluating sex-based discrimination claims through examining six key 
cases in the Twentieth century.  
 
Project Description 
In the 1970s, the Supreme Court pronounced a new test for laws that treated the two 
sexes differently. This test, known as “intermediate scrutiny,” was stricter than the Court’s usual 
standard (the “rational basis” test), but not as stringent as the test used for cases involving racial 
distinction (the “strict scrutiny” test). It only applies to sex-based discrimination litigation. This 
work tracks and analyzes the jurisprudence in the Supreme Court that led to the implementation 
of intermediate scrutiny through examining different cases. These are Muller v. Oregon (1908); 
Goesaert v. Cleary (1948); Reed v. Reed (1971); Frontiero v. Richardson (1973); Weinberger v. 
Wiesenfeld (1975); and Craig v. Boren (1976). Muller and Goesaert demonstrate how the Court 
employed the rational basis test in sex-based discrimination cases during the first half of the 
Twentieth century. Reed, Frontiero, and Weinberger detail litigator and activist Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg’s efforts to persuade the court to establish a test specifically for evaluating these cases. 
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Craig explains the monumental case that finally convinced the Court to pronounce intermediate 
scrutiny. Together, these six cases provide a cohesive narrative of the jurisprudence and socio-
cultural history that clearly articulated the path to intermediate scrutiny.  
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DEDICATION 
 
 To the women who came before — may your lives and undying struggle for equality 
motivate women to come like it has me.   
5 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
First and foremost, I would like to thank my research advisors for their constant support 
throughout this project. Dr. Katherine Unterman, in addition to guiding both historical and legal 
research, continuously encourages me. Dr. Randy Gordon explains nuances and suggests sources 
to properly develop the legal aspect of this work. I could write nothing without their aid. 
Thanks also belongs to those who have directed my path until this point. My mother, 
herself an attorney, exposed me to the law from a young age. Watching her as I grew up taught 
me that women, indeed all people, are capable of achieving whatever they desire if they work 
hard enough. She is the reason I am passionate about the law. Dr. Sara Alpern has inspired and 
shaped me more than she could possibly know. Her enthusiasm about women’s history and 
equality is contagious; learning from her has given me a goal in life. Dr. Sarah Misemer 
relentlessly searches for opportunities for me to excel, and creates them when others do not exist. 
The value of her mentorship is immeasurable.  My best friend, Hannah Fisher, has read every 
draft I’ve written, and reminds me to work hard but never take myself too seriously. These 
people have loved me unconditionally. They believe in me, even when I struggle to believe in 
myself. I am forever in their debt.  
Thank you all. 
  
6 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Constitutionally, women have a big problem–  they’re not in it. Searching the founding 
document for the words “woman” or “women,” “female,” ladies,” or other similarly feminine 
words will yield no results.1 Even though Abigail Adams raised the question of “women’s role” 
in a “new post revolutionary society” by begging her husband John to “remember the ladies” at 
the Constitutional Convention, they were forgotten.2 That is because the cultural environment in 
which the Framers drafted it was patriarchal.  
Women possessed very few rights. The only true legal protection they were afforded was 
through the rights of their husbands.3 Legal scholar Sir William Blackstone wrote that  
[b]y marriage, the husband and wife are one person in the law: that is, the very 
being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at 
least incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband: under whose wing, 
protection, and cover, she performs every thing.4 
 
The Constitution did not consider women to be full persons, only subsidiaries of their male 
relatives.5 Following contemporary reasoning, there was no need to include women in the 
constitution because their rights were secured in their husbands.  
 But, as one legal historian points out, the “intimate association between men and women 
does not in and of itself guarantee respect and protection” to women, and women’s exclusion 
                                                 
1 U.S. Constitution. Not even the 19th Amendment (1920), which effectively granted women the right to 
vote, uses gendered language. Instead, it reads, “The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied 
or abridged by the United States or by any State on the account of sex.” The amendment implies this right for 
women, but does not explicitly extend suffrage to them. 
2 John Adams, My dearest friend: letters of Abigail and John Adams, ed. Margaret A. Hogan and C. James 
Taylor (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007): 110.  
3 Mary Cacioppo, “Women and the Constitution,” Ohio Northern University Law Review 19 (1993): 692.  
4 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. 1 (Oxford, 1765), 442. 
5 George Edwards, “Women and the Law: From Abigail to Sandra,” University of Cincinnati Law Review 
52, no.4 (1983): 969.  
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from the Constitution did not safeguard them from encountering constitutional issues.6 
Discrimination on the basis of sex was perhaps the most obvious form of legal struggle women 
faced. Women were routinely denied the opportunity to participate in public life, instead being 
confined to the domestic sphere. 
Take, for example, the story of Myra Bradwell. Despite having passed her examinations 
and character requirements, the State of Illinois denied Bradwell a license to practice law in 
1869. The State reasoned that married women could not enter into binding contracts. Upon 
appeal, the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed Illinois’ decision, and added that the 
right to practice law was not a fundamental right.7 Justice Bradley concurred, and 
[r]ecognized a wide difference in the respective spheres and destinies of 
man and woman. Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender. The 
natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex 
evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life. The constitution of the 
family organization, which is founded in the divine nature of things, indicated the 
domestic sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and functions of 
womanhood.8 
 
The Court, therefore, reasoned that confining women to their domestic realm was a fitting 
and justified classification. Other women met the same fate as Bradwell when they 
encountered discrimination.  
 Ironically, the Supreme Court decided Bradwell in 1873, only a few years after 
the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution in 1868. 
The Amendment’s purpose was to expand the definition of citizenship to incorporate 
former slaves into the populous following the Civil War.  The Amendment guarantees 
that: 
                                                 
6 Akhil Reed Amar, “Women and the Constitution,” Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 18 (1995): 
467.  
7 Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 139 (1873).  
8 Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1873).  
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All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor 
shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.9  
 
This definition of citizenship would seemingly apply to Bradwell and all other native-born 
American women, regardless of race. Still, in Bradwell, the Supreme Court interpreted the 
Amendment in a way that still excluded women.10  Indeed, in other cases from that period, the 
Court made it clear that it only considered the Fourteenth Amendment to apply to newly freed 
slaves, specifically black men.11 
 In addition to the newly expanded definition of citizenship, the last sentence of the 
Amendment, the equal protection clause, is important to discrimination claims. The equal 
protection clause prohibits governments from discriminating against similarly situated 
individuals.12  
 Most discrimination claims are evaluated using the rational basis test.  In order to 
function, governments frequently categorize people. For example, States divide those 
over and under the age of twenty-one to regulate the sale and consumption of alcoholic 
beverages.13 Classifications like these pass the rational basis test because they are 
rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest, like public safety or adolescent 
brain development.14 Simply put, as long as the government can demonstrate a rational 
                                                 
9 U.S. Constitution, amend. XIV, § 1. Emphasis added.  
10  Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1873). 
11 Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). 
12 Jody Feder, Congressional Research Service, RL 30253, Sex Discrimination in the Supreme Court: 
Developments in the Law (2008), 1-2.   
13 Texas Penal Code § 106.01.  
14 Jody Feder, Sex Discrimination in the Supreme Court, 2. 
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relationship between a discriminatory law and a legislative goal, then the law will survive 
the rational basis test.  
 In fact, all discrimination claims were evaluated under rational basis until the 
Twentieth century. In the Thirties, the Supreme Court developed the doctrine of suspect 
classes in United States v. Carolene Products Company (1938).15 The Court determined 
that some categorizations are inherently suspect. These classes are known as immutable 
traits—things one cannot control or change about oneself. The most visible suspect class 
is race, but national origin and alienage are also considered to be immutable traits. When 
a law discriminates on the basis of one of these classifications, then courts employ strict 
scrutiny. In order to survive the test, governments must prove that the classification is 
narrowly tailored to a compelling governmental interest, and that the classification 
accomplishes that interest in the least injurious way possible.16 Categorizations along the 
lines of a suspect class are frequently invalidated. A good example of how the test was 
applied to nullify a suspect classification discrimination can be found in Brown v. the 
Board, which overruled the “separate but equal” doctrine of racial segregation in 
education.17 Legal scholar Gerald Gunther described the test as “strict in theory and fatal 
in fact,” meaning that review under strict scrutiny is a hurdle that very few laws 
overcome.18 Strict scrutiny is the most active form of judicial review, while the rational 
basis test is the least active.19  
                                                 
15 United States v. Carolene Products Company, 304 U.S. 155 (1938). 
16 Jody Feder, Sex Discrimination in the Supreme Court, 2. 
17 Brown v. the Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).   
18 Gerald Gunther, “The Supreme Court, 1971 Term,” Harvard Law Review 86, no. 1 (November 1972): 8.  
19 Ashutosh Bhagwat, “Purpose Scrutiny in Constitutional Analysis,” California Law Review 85, no. 2 
(March 1997): 303.  
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 Although one cannot help the biological sex they are assigned at birth, sex-based 
classifications are neither inherently suspect, not subject to strict scrutiny. Instead, they 
are evaluated using the intermediate scrutiny test, which is tougher than rational basis, 
but not as stringent as strict scrutiny. Additionally, intermediate scrutiny only applies to 
sex-based discriminations. This test was not enunciated until 1976.20  
 Until the 1970s, all sex-based discrimination claims were evaluated using the 
rational basis test. These discriminatory laws were routinely upheld as protections for 
women. However, some saw the link between biological sex and other suspect classes, 
and worked to change the process of judicial review for women. During the Twentieth 
century, female litigators and activists brought cases to the Supreme Court, urging the 
Justices to consider sex as a class protected from discrimination by employing the equal 
protection clause, and eventually succeeded in establishing the intermediate scrutiny test. 
 The work of women like Florence Kelley and Josephine Goldmark, Anne 
Davidow, and Ruth Bader Ginsburg in sex-based discrimination litigation reflected 
contemporary debates about the role of women at the time. Adamant progressive 
reformers, Kelley and Goldmark worked to establish and uphold in court protective labor 
laws for women at the beginning of the century. Then, Anne Davidow made the 
groundbreaking claim that women were entitled to equal protection in 1948. Later, Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg argued in a series of cases before the Supreme Court that sex-based 
discrimination claims should be evaluated using a test more rigorous than rational basis 
by comparing sex- and race-based classifications. Each of these women dedicated their 
lives to improving the legal status of women, perpetually forgotten and excluded by male 
                                                 
20  Jody Feder, Sex Discrimination in the Supreme Court, 2-3.  
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Framers. Their work was crucial to the development and establishment of the 
intermediate scrutiny test, which finally secured for women at least some level of equal 
protection.  
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CHAPTER I 
“THE TRADITION” AND RATIONAL BASIS 
 
Muller v. Oregon: Progressive Reform Qualifies as Rational Basis 
On Labor Day 1905, Emma Gotcher worked for more than ten hours in one day at Curt 
Muller’s Grand Laundry in Portland, Oregon. She was forced to do so by her supervisor, Joe 
Haselback. This directly violated a labor law ratified by the State in 1903.21 Ironically, this Labor 
Day incident (the date does not seem fortuitous) sparked a legal battle over protective labor 
legislation. Muller v. Oregon (1908) went on appeal all the way up to the Supreme Court of the 
United States.22 On behalf of Oregon, Louis D. Brandeis submitted an unusual brief to the 
Justices that, instead of relying solely on statutes and prior court decisions, employed 
testimonies, scholarship and viewpoints from beyond the legal community. This extra-legal 
information highlighted the Oregon legislature’s rationale, supporting his argument that the law 
was a good and necessary progressive reform that ensured the safety and wellbeing of women 
workers by limiting their work.23  The untraditional Brandeis brief influenced the justices’ 
ruling.24 As such, Muller v. Oregon and its subsequent landmark decision established the practice 
of sociological jurisprudence during the Progressive era, and, furthermore, confirmed that 
legislative intent to improve health and welfare qualified as a rational basis for discrimination. 
         Specifically, Curt Muller’s laundry violated Oregon’s Ten-Hour Women’s Labor Law of 
1903. In years prior, tensions in Portland regarding labor ran high: 1902 saw seventeen strikes, 
                                                 
21 Nancy Woloch, A Class by Herself, 58. 
22  Nancy Woloch, A Class by Herself, 61. 
23 Louis D. Brandeis, Curt Muller, plaintiff in error, v. the State of Oregon: Brief for Defendant in Error, 
1908.  
24 Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 420 (1908). 
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four of which involved women workers. Union leaders and strike participants used these 
opportunities to inform the public and government about the scientific and sociological realities 
of industry. Unions and labor lobbyist groups pressured the legislature to pass protective labor 
legislation. Over time, the goals of these groups narrowed. Instead of demanding eight hour 
workdays for all workers, they shifted their focus to ten hour workdays for women only. The 
more modest proposal was successful.25  Passed February 19, 1903, the legislation stated that “no 
female [shall] be employed in any mechanical establishment, or factory, or laundry in this State 
for more than ten hours during any one day.”26 The law had two immediate and direct effects: it 
limited women’s workdays within those industries to ten hours, and limited capitalists’ profits 
derived from over-worked and underpaid laborers. The latter was bound to upset some business 
owners, like Curt Muller, and so it did. 
         Two weeks after Muller purposefully violated the law, the circuit court of Multnomah 
County pressed charges against him.27 Muller originally entered a plea of not guilty, but then 
refiled his plea with the court to claim that no crime had been committed.28 The district attorney 
was certainly aware of the rising unionism in Portland at the time.29 He called six other women 
from the Shirt, Waist, and Laundry Workers’ Union, the same union as Gotcher, who were also 
employed at Grand Laundry — Berth Gerhke, Helene Peterson, Esther Brooks, Eunice McLeod, 
a Mrs. Reeves, and Maude Reeves— to the stand as witnesses.30 Their corroboration of Emma 
Gotcher’s story easily won the case for Oregon. The court found Curt Muller guilty of violating 
                                                 
25 Nancy Woloch, A Class by Herself, 56-57. 
26 Ten-Hour Woman’s Labor Law, Oregon, Session Laws, pg. 148 (1903).  
27 Nancy Woloch, A Class by Herself, 58-59. 
28 Nancy Woloch, A Class by Herself, 59.  
29 Nancy Woloch, A Class by Herself, 57-60.  
30 Nancy Woloch, A Class by Herself, 59.  
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the Ten-Hour Law, charged him with a misdemeanor, and fined him the minimum fine of ten 
dollars on top of court costs.31 
         Had Muller not demurred his not guilty plea, the story of Muller v. Oregon would have 
likely ended in the circuit court of Multnomah County. The prosecution’s job was simply too 
easy, as all they had to do was prove that Muller violated the law. Any appeal would have likely 
ended in the same ruling.32 
Rather, Muller’s claim that he had not committed a crime gave him a different way to 
approach the case. Instead of trying to prove that Muller had not violated the law, Muller’s 
defense lawyers sought to convince justices that the Ten-Hour Law was in violation of the 
United States Constitution.33  
When Muller appealed to the United States Supreme Court, his lawyers used this line of 
reasoning as the basis of their appeal. They claimed that Oregon’s lawmakers exceeded the 
police power of the State by creating legislation that violated the Fourteenth Amendment. They 
cited section one of the Amendment to make a two-pronged argument. 
First, Muller claimed that the law infringed his right to freedom of contract. This right is 
based on the clause in the Fourteenth Amendment that no “State [shall] deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property.”34 This aspect of Muller’s defense assumed that property included 
profit. By limiting the workday of Muller’s workforce at the Grand Laundry, Oregon directly 
deprived him of profit by limiting the number of labor hours he could contract from female 
employees. Therefore, Muller argued, regardless of how or if the law protected women workers, 
                                                 
31 Nancy Woloch, A Class by Herself, 60.  
32 Nancy Woloch, A Class by Herself, 60. 
33 Nancy Woloch, A Class by Herself, 59.  
34 U.S. Constitution, amend. XIV, § 1. 
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it violated his constitutional right to unregulated pursuit of property through the freedom of 
contract. 
The Muller legal team tried to strengthen this argument by citing other recent Supreme 
Court decisions involving protective labor legislation and the Fourteenth Amendment. Most 
significantly, in Lochner v. New York (1905), a New York law created to protect the health of 
bakers by limiting their workweeks to sixty hours, with a maximum of ten hours per day, was 
disputed. Like Muller, Lochner asserted that the New York law was an unconstitutional violation 
of the right to freedom of contract. The Court sided five-to-four with Lochner. Their decision 
was largely contextualized by the growth of unionism and successful union lobbying across the 
country.35 The Court feared that upholding a law that restricted labor in one industry would 
create precedent for similar laws regarding other industries. To articulate this anxiety, Justice 
Peckham wrote in the opinion that “it might be safely affirmed that almost all occupations more 
or less affect the health.”36 If this were the case, then “no trade, no occupation, no mode of 
earning one’s living, could escape this all-pervading power.”37 To avoid expanding the police 
power of the State and to curb the rising tide of union-lobbied legislation, the Court ruled against 
New York law. To justify their decision to deter protective labor legislation, the Court claimed 
that “there is no reasonable ground, on the score of health, for interfering with the liberty of the 
person or the right to free contract, by determining the hours of labor.”38 Due to the similarities 
between the laws, Muller hoped that the legal precedent established in Lochner v. New York 
                                                 
35 Philippa Strum, Louis D. Brandeis: Justice for the People (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1984), 
118.  
36 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 59 (1905).  
37 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 59 (1905). 
38 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57 (1905); Philippa Strum, Louis D. Brandeis, 118. 
16 
would convince the justices to rule against the Oregon law, and to protect Muller’s right to 
freedom of contract.39 
The second part of Muller’s argument also contended that the Fourteenth Amendment 
rendered the Ten-Hour Law unconstitutional. The core of his argument depended on the equal 
protection clause, which prohibits class legislation without rational basis. This interpretation of 
the Fourteenth Amendment logically prohibits gendered legislation. However, the Ten-Hour Law 
specifically says that “no female,” not no person, can work for more than ten hours during any 
one day within the State.40 Furthermore, the law only applied to a certain class of woman 
worker—females “employed in any mechanical establishment, or factory, or laundry.”41 Thus, 
Muller argued that the law was unconstitutional because it did not afford equal protection to men 
as it did to women, nor the same protection to women employed in other industries.  
         Both of these arguments lent themselves to Muller’s main conclusion: that the Ten-Hour 
Law was an overextension of the police power granted to Oregon because it violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Muller’s lawyers submitted these assertions in a brief to the Supreme 
Court justices. Muller’s argument, contextualized in the Lochner era, was strong. 
 However, the National Consumers League (NCL or the League) wanted to make sure that 
Oregon had even better representation. The League, a civic-minded organization run by reformer 
Florence Kelley and dominated by women, researched social problems related to commerce, and 
worked to create a fair marketplace for both consumers and workers. Thus, much of their efforts 
focused on lobbying for protective labor legislation and ensuring victory in subsequent 
                                                 
39 Nancy Woloch, A Class by Herself, 73.  
40 Ten-Hour Woman’s Labor Law, Oregon, Session Laws, pg. 148 (1903).   
41 Ten-Hour Woman’s Labor Law, Oregon, Session Laws, pg. 148 (1903). 
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litigation.42 The importance of the League is not to be underestimated: “Every significant piece 
of legislation that dealt with child labor, maternal and child health, working conditions for 
women, and the like bore Kelley’s imprint and that of the Consumers League.”43  When Kelley 
found out that Muller was to be argued before the Supreme Court, she and her associate 
Josephine Goldmark began to eagerly search for an attorney. Kelley decided that Oregon should 
seek to prove that being overworked was dangerous and negatively affected women’s health by 
providing the Court with factual evidence to support the claim.44  
 When she was out of town, other League members asked Joseph H. Choate if he would 
argue the case. Choate was a prominent leader in the New York Bar Association, had recently 
served as U.S. Ambassador to Great Britain, and his wife was honorary Vice President of the 
New York Consumers League. Although Choate was distinguished and would have been 
advantageous to Oregon, Kelley did not like Choate; she found him to be unsympathetic. More 
importantly, though, she thought that he would not argue the case by focusing on sociological 
data like she wanted.45 Luckily, Choate declined the League’s offer, opining that “a big husky 
Irishwoman should work more than ten hours a day… if she and her employer so desired.”46 
 According to future NCL pro bono lawyer Felix Frankfurter, Kelley and the League 
endured several rejections. “[No] eminent lawyer cared to argue such a case,” because “there was 
no money in it.”47  
                                                 
42 Evelyn R. Benson, “Josephine Goldmark (1877-1950): A Biographical Sketch,” Public Health Nursing 
4, no. 1 (1987): 49-50.  
43 Evelyn R. Benson, “Josephine Goldmark,” 49.   
44 Philippa Strum, Louis D. Brandeis, 115. 
45  Philippa Strum, Louis D. Brandeis, 115-116. 
46 Quoted in Ruth Bader Ginsburg, “Lessons Learned from Louis D. Brandeis,” BrandeisNow. 
http://www.brandeis.edu/now/2016/january/ginsburg-remarks.html.  
47 Quoted in Nancy Woloch, A Class by Herself, 62. 
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 Still, Kelley did not give up her search. On November 14, 1907, she approached Louis D. 
Brandeis, who had been her first choice all along because she knew he had an interest in 
including extra-legal information in his arguments. She and Goldmark, Brandeis’ sister-in-law, 
traveled to Boston’s Back Bay neighborhood to visit the prominent attorney. Brandeis happily 
agreed to represent the State of Oregon on two conditions: if the Attorney General of Oregon 
invited him as well, and if he was the lead attorney so that he could control how the case was 
argued.48 Just like that, the League and Brandeis became the two major players in Muller v. 
Oregon.  
         Just as Kelley and Goldmark had anticipated, Brandeis used his position as lead attorney 
on the case to formulate the argument and write the revolutionary brief as he best saw fit. In fact, 
the difference between the methods employed by Muller and Brandeis exemplifies a change in 
legal and judicial practice during the turn of the century. Leading up to Muller v. Oregon, 
judicial formalism was common. Formalism held that analyzing the law and prior court 
decisions, and then applying the principles found therein could resolve all legal disputes.49 
Muller’s legal team took this approach. In the Muller brief, only legal sources—the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the Ten-Hour Law, and Lochner v. New York and other cases—were cited.50 
However, the Progressive era and its concern with the general well-being of society began 
influencing legal thought in the late 1800s and early 1900s. 
         One prominent legal theorist of the time was Roscoe Pound. Pound believed that 
formalism stagnated the natural development of the law. Furthermore, he believed that the law 
                                                 
48 Nancy Woloch, A Class by Herself, 54-55 and 62. 
49 Beau James Brock, “Modern American Supreme Court Judicial Methodology and Its Origins: A Critical 
Analysis of the Legal Thought of Roscoe Pound,” Journal of the Legal Profession 35, no. 1 (2011):190-191; Kunal 
M. Parker, “Context in History and Law: A Study of the Late Nineteenth-Century American Jurisprudence of 
Custom,” History and Law Review 24, no. 3 (Fall 2006): 485; Joseph H. Drake, “The Sociological Interpretation of 
Law,” Michigan Law Review 16, no. 8 (January 1918): 609. 
50 Nancy Woloch, A Class by Herself, 70-73.  
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ought to be moral, supporting the good of society.51 To combine these two ideas, Pound urged 
for “legal precepts [to be] regarded more as guides to results which are socially just and less as 
inflexible molds.”52 To ameliorate societal ills, legislatures should consider the social realities, 
and create laws accordingly. In court, this could be achieved by considering sociology, 
economics, politics, and other disciplines when ruling on laws.53 Once cognizant of these facts, 
courts would allow legislative solutions to societal problems as long as the laws were not blatant 
violations of the Constitution.54 Ultimately, in his opinion, the law and judicial system should 
support the human condition through social reform because the law and the courts affect 
society.55 
         Brandeis incorporated Pound’s philosophies into his unconventional brief. He used the 
Lochner ruling to form his conclusion. The Court had struck down the New York law because it 
found “no reasonable ground, on the score of health, for interfering with the liberty of the person 
or the right of free contract.”56 In other words, the Justices found no rational basis to support the 
law. With this ruling in mind, Brandeis set out to do what New York’s lawyers had failed to do. 
Brandeis aimed to convince the Justices that there was a direct connection between the number 
of hours worked and health, providing Oregon with reasonable ground to regulate workdays. 
         Only two of the 113 pages submitted in the Brandeis brief followed the practice of 
formalism by analyzing American legislation.57 In these two pages, he informed the Court that 
twenty states had enacted legislation to protect the health of female laborers, and that “in no 
                                                 
51 Roscoe Pound, “Spurious Interpretation,” Columbia Law Review 7, no. 6 (June 1907): 384.  
52 Beau James Brock, “Legal Thought of Roscoe Pound,” 192.  
53 Maxwell Bloomfield, “Constitutional Ideology and Progressive Fiction,” Journal of American Culture 
18, no. 1 (1995): 77. 
54 Philippa Strum, Louis D. Brandeis, 124. 
55 Beau James Brock, “Legal Thought of Roscoe Pound,” 195. 
56 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57 (1905). 
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State has any such law been held unconstitutional, except in Illinois,” with Ritchie v. the People, 
where the Supreme Court used similar reasoning as in the Lochner decision.58 Although this 
portion of his brief was necessary to his argument, other sections of the Brandeis brief were far 
more consequential. 
         The other 111 pages submitted to the Justices relied on extra-legal sources to advance his 
claim that work is related to health. The bulk of the Brandeis brief sought to prove that the work 
is directly related to individual and public health.  Kelley, Goldmark, and Brandeis all 
understood that articulating this point would require substantive data. The task of amassing this 
data fell to the League as the legislative history of the Oregon law provided no help.59 
 Goldmark gathered a team of ten researchers. Goldmark and her team searched Columbia 
University’s library, the New York Public Library, and the Library of Congress with a fine-
toothed comb for sources. They found British reports on factory and medical commissions; 
information about other states’ maximum hour laws; expert testimony from doctors, academics, 
factory and sanitation inspectors, other investigators, legislators, bureaucrats, and other foreign 
governments; and social science studies that confirmed work and working conditions have a 
direct effect on one’s health. Particularly helpful information came from the Massachusetts 
Board of Labor Statistics, which conducted social science research, and had been collecting data 
on women workers since 1870.60 Brandeis stressed to the League that he would need “facts, 
published by expert knowledge of industry in its relation to women's hours of labor.”61 Goldmark 
delivered.  
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 Together, Brandeis and Goldmark then began to craft the brief using the information 
Goldmark had collected. They particularly focused on work in laundries, and how that related to 
a laundress’ health to address the specificities of the Oregon law. Drawing on expert opinion, 
particularly medical information, the Brandeis brief informed the Justices that work in a laundry 
had a direct negative effect on women’s health. Standing for hours on end caused varicose veins 
and leg ulcers; laboring in damp conditions created by the steam and wet floors developed 
pulmonary disease; working the irons led to burns, headaches, and sore eyes; and, mechanical 
accidents left women mutilated and disfigured, often without limbs.62 Using statistics gathered 
from medical records, Brandeis argued that not only did work in laundries cause these ailments, 
but also that these injuries and illnesses were common amongst laundry employees.63 
         The sex-specific nature of the Oregon law required Brandeis to assert that women 
deserved protections not afforded to men. Again citing expert opinions and studies, the brief 
claimed “overwork… is more disastrous to the health of women than men” “because of their 
special physical organization.”64 Harming women’s health, Brandeis argued, negatively affected 
society as a whole because sick women could not properly care for their children or future 
children. If women’s labor were regulated, they would have time to raise the nation’s next 
generation well.65 In Brandeis’ opinion, these “facts of common knowledge” and expert 
testimonies clearly supported the notion that woman’s sexual difference from man merited her 
special treatment under the law.66 
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         The conclusion of the Brandeis brief is simple: the information gleaned from studies and 
expert testimony make it clear that being overworked in a laundry is detrimental to women’s 
health, and therefore, Oregon lawmakers acted reasonably in creating the law in an effort to 
protect women workers’ health.67 
         The Supreme Court unanimously sided with Oregon nine-to-zero. The justices agreed the 
Lochner decision only applied to men.68 The Fourteenth Amendment, therefore, specifically 
protected a man’s right to freedom of contract. On the other hand, the justices ruled that “the 
regulation of [woman’s] hour labor falls within the police power of the State, and a statute 
directed exclusively to such regulation does not conflict with… the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.”69 Thus, Oregon’s Ten-Hour Labor law was constitutional. 
         Justice Brewer delivered the opinion on behalf of the Supreme Court. Although he did 
include legal precedent, such as the Lochner decision, in his discussion of the ruling, he also 
heavily cited the Brandeis brief. In fact, he wrote that it was the Court’s “judicial cognizance of 
all matters of general knowledge,” meaning the extra-legal information accumulated by 
Goldmark and presented by Brandeis, that led to the consideration of “woman’s physical 
structure, and the functions she performed in consequence thereof.”70 These sexual differences 
from men are what “justify special legislation restricting or qualifying the conditions under 
which [women] should be permitted to toil.”71 Though he broke tradition by including non-legal 
information in his brief, Brandeis was able to convince the Supreme Court that there was, in fact, 
a reasonable connection between labor and health. This kept Muller v. Oregon from the same 
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fate as Lochner v. New York. By including data from the social sciences, Brandeis proved that 
Oregon had good reason to discriminate against women in order to protect them. The law passed 
the rational basis test. The Brandeis brief, however unconventional it was, won the case for 
Oregon. 
Josephine Goldmark (and the League, more broadly) is largely to credit for outcome of 
the case. Had she not amassed the pertinent data, the Brandeis brief might not have so thoroughly 
convinced the justices that workplace conditions did in fact affect health.  Thus, Muller likely 
would have suffered the same fate as Lochner. As Goldmark and Brandeis worked together on 
cases, he acknowledged the value of Goldmark’s work in collecting data by listing her as his 
assistant on the title page of his briefs. According the historian Philippa Strum, “[he] had wanted 
to do as much in the Muller case… but decided that he had already made that brief 
unconventional enough.”72 
         Although the Supreme Court’s decision in Muller v. Oregon (1908) included sexist 
language expressing a belief in female physical inferiority, the success of Brandeis’ brief in 
persuading the justices to consider extra-legal information and thus rule in favor of public health 
established Roscoe Pound’s philosophy of sociological jurisprudence within the American 
courts. Muller v. Oregon went against the legal precedent of Lochner v. New York. The Court 
ruled that intent to enact progressive health and labor reforms is a proper and legitimate 
government interest, so discriminating against women workers in certain industries passed the 
rational basis test. The outcome of Muller was not unique. This rationale was frequently 
employed to uphold sex-based discriminations. 
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Women, Labor and Law until 1948 
Social feminist reformers, such as Florence Kelley and Josephine Goldmark of the 
National Consumers League and women from other volunteer organizations, witnessed the 
realization of progressive goals like protective labor legislation, minimum wages, and safety 
regulations in the 1920s and 1930s with the establishment of government agencies intended to 
promote the wellbeing of the citizenry. For example, the federal Department of Labor added the 
Women’s and the Children’s Bureaus during the Twenties. Female reformers served in 
leadership positions, and women constituted the vast majority of the rest of the staff in these 
offices. The resulting bureaucratic structure that developed both “professionalized and 
institutionalized… reform culture,” argues historian Robyn Muncy.73 Then, during the New Deal 
era, women served on advisory boards for agencies such as the National Recovery 
Administration, the Federal Emergency Relief Administration, the Works Progress 
Administration, and the National Youth Administration. Women’s participation in these 
programs maximized the influence of the social reform platform by aligning it with the federal 
government.74 
Although protective labor legislation for women was a core pillar of the social feminist 
agenda, these laws were a temporary expedient. Eleanor Roosevelt, herself a member of the 
National Women’s Trade Union League, articulated this point clearly when she wrote that “until 
we actually have equal pay and are assured a living wage for both men’s work and women’s 
work, I believe in minimum wage boards and regulating by law the number of hours women may 
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work.”75 The end goal was to achieve equality amongst the sexes, particularly within the 
workforce. 
World War II created a labor crisis in the United States that had potential to bring about 
equality, but ultimately served to reinforce pre-war gender roles. Responding to the “war 
emergency,” approximately six million American women entered the workforce during the early 
Forties. Many of these women took well-paying jobs in industry to replace the men who had 
gone to war. Additionally, state governments had to modify protective labor laws to 
accommodate economic needs and satisfy defense industry demands. Maximum hour laws were 
relaxed, many sex-based exclusionary laws were repealed, and legislation allowing for overtime 
pay was enacted. Many of these legal changes were meant to only be effective for the duration of 
the war. Regardless, the women who worked during World War II appreciated access to good 
jobs, high wages, and premium pay for overtime work.76  
The massive influx of women into the workforce during wartime had the potential to 
significantly alter gender roles and the family structure by making men and women economic 
equals, but widespread fear of financially independent women thwarted this change. Not only 
had women left the domestic sphere to enter the workforce, primarily to fill previously sex-
segregated jobs, but American women had also demonstrated that they could maintain a 
functioning society without men.77 Why then would Rosie the Riveter voluntarily return to the 
home when the men came back from war? Realizing that women would likely not willingly 
revert to pre-war gender roles sparked intense anxieties about the family dynamic. 
                                                 
75 Quoted in Nancy Woloch, A Class by Herself, 156. 
76 Nancy Woloch, A Class by Herself, 167-168.  
77 Elaine Tyler May, Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era (New York: Basic Books, 
1988), 71. 
26 
Single, working women became the biggest threat to family life and morality. Wartime 
propaganda warned that the “greater social freedom of women … strikes at the heart of family 
stability… When women work, earn, and spend as much as men do, they are going to ask for 
equal rights with men… The decay of established moralities [comes] about as a by-product.”78 
Assumptions about the disruption of the family structure and moral fabric of the nation if women 
were to remain in the workforce abounded. Working women were believed to be poor mothers 
because separation from the home necessitated separation from children and employment stole 
time from child rearing activities. Without women primarily acting as mothers, many 
professionals and observers agreed that future generations would suffer.  
More importantly though, increased female participation in the wartime economy would 
inevitably create an unemployment crisis for men when peace came if women were to refuse to 
return to the domestic sphere. Anticipating disaster, popular literature and politicians begged 
“single women to relinquish their jobs and find husbands when the hostilities ceased.”79 
Prioritizing jobs for veterans and the maintenance of the family structure, government-sponsored 
campaigns aimed to force women back into the home.80 
 
Goesaert v. Cleary: Sexist Lobbying Disguised as Rational Basis 
When Valentine and Margaret Goesaert, Caroline McMahon, and Gertrude Nadroski 
woke up on the morning of May 1, 1947 in Dearborn, Michigan, they were in violation of a law 
designed to force women out of typically male professions. Overnight their status as bartenders 
and bar owners became illegal.  
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Historically, women were excluded from bartending because they were believed to 
neither be as conversational nor as smart as men. Bartenders frequently filled the role of 
confidant, and were expected to tell “patrons the score of any game, the battles of every war, and 
dispense advice on numerous subjects.”81 In addition, it was also commonly thought that women 
lacked the physical stature to keep peace in a bar and handle drunk patrons. Combining these 
assumptions with a desire to keep bartending a male profession, bartender’s unions across the 
country often endorsed laws that prohibited women from bartending. In places where such laws 
did not exist, unionists would picket bars that hired women or police the industry themselves.82   
However, with male labor scarce during World War II, all-male unions such as the 
International Union of Hotel and Restaurant Employees and Bartenders supported changing or 
suspending exclusionary laws and offering contracts to female bartenders with the stipulation 
that their employment would only last until peacetime. Women subsequently entered industry to 
meet the demand for labor. When hostilities ceased, unionists sought to put exclusionary laws 
back the books.83 Unions and their supporters thought that removing women from their short-
lived careers as bartenders and bar owners would create jobs for veterans.84 
In Michigan, women were able to enter the bar trade earlier than their counterparts 
elsewhere in the country. After Prohibition ended, the state enacted the Liquor Control Act of 
1933, which allowed women in Michigan to own and tend bars.85 Under this law, Valentine 
Goesaert purchased her bar at the Roosevelt Hotel, Caroline McMahon owned and operated a 
tavern in Dearborn, and Margaret Valentine and Gertrude Nadroski began careers as bartenders.  
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 Although women had already joined the bartending industry in Michigan, the Detroit 
Local 562 chapter of the Michigan Bartender’s Union was not unlike its unionist brothers 
elsewhere. Members regularly socialized with government officials, including judges, attorneys, 
and legislators, and advocated for a law that would prohibit women from bartending. According 
to union representative Thomas Kearney, the Detroit Local 562 “didn’t care whether the law 
[was] passed by the state legislature, the Detroit Council or simply by issuance of a regulation by 
the Liquor Control Commission”; all the unionists cared about was insuring that the bartending 
industry was reserved for men and that member veterans could return to work.86 Their lobbying 
efforts were successful. 
 In 1945, Michigan state legislators amended the state’s Liquor Control Act of 1933. The 
changes specified eligibility for a bartending license: a bartender — defined by the law as “a 
person who mixes or pours alcoholic liquor behind a bar,” not one who serves alcohol to 
customers — must be over the age of twenty-one, employed in a licensed liquor establishment in 
a city with a population of 50,000 or more, and male.87 The only women permitted to be 
bartenders were the wives or daughters of the male bar owner.88 The Local Detroit 562 had 
achieved their goal of female exclusion from the industry as any other woman bartender instantly 
became a criminal after the law became effective on May 1.  
 This created a serious financial issue for female bar owners like Valentine Goesaert and 
Caroline McMahon. Before the act was passed, they had legally acquired licenses to own their 
bars, and reserved the right to freely contract employees. Afterwards, they were faced with a 
choice: hire an all-male staff to work while idly supervising, or go out of business. Both options 
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would decrease profitability. Similarly, female bartenders like Margaret Goesaert and Gertrude 
Nadroski were robbed of their jobs and their livelihood.  
 Angry, the Goesaerts, McMahon and Nadroski contacted famous local Detroit lawyer 
Anne Davidow. Davidow was drawn to women’s issues and the growing woman suffrage 
movement at a young age. As a teenager, she stood upon soap boxes outside factory gates, giving 
speeches and campaigning for women’s right to vote. Her fervor for women’s rights only 
increased with age. In 1918, Davidow applied to law schools. Although her application to the 
Detroit College of Law, her brother Larry’s alma mater, was rejected because of her sex, she was 
admitted to the University of Detroit Law School as one of four women in the class of 1920. 
That year was monumental for Davidow: she graduated from law school, cast her first vote after 
the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment, and joined Larry in practice at Davidow & 
Davidow. The firm was very successful, winning several cases in the Michigan Supreme Court. 
The Davidows gained recognition as they skillfully handled legal work for the United 
Automobile Workers union and other labor causes. While Larry was committed to the labor 
cause, Anne subscribed to the progressive agenda of social reform. A lifelong member of the 
Women’s Lawyers’ Association, she was “ready and willing to fight for a woman’s right to work 
wherever she wanted,” even in a bar.89  
 Anne Davidow agreed to represent the Goesaerts, McMahon and Nadroski, along with 
twenty-four other female bartenders and owners as unnamed plaintiffs. Davidow litigated a class 
action suit using the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment against Owen J. 
Cleary, Felix H. H. Flynn, and G. Mennan Williams, members of the Michigan Liquor Control 
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Commission (or, the Commission). When a Michigan court upheld the law, she appealed to the 
Supreme Court of the United States.90  
 Michigan’s lawyers followed a traditional model to develop their argument. The brief 
submitted to the justices provided a concise history of liquor laws in Michigan meant to 
demonstrate that the state had the power to regulate bartending: Prior to Prohibition, the state had 
no centralized administrative power over liquor traffic, but delegated regulation to 
municipalities. Then, in 1916, the state prohibited “the manufacture, sale, keeping for sale, 
giving away, bartending or furnishing of any intoxicating liquors,” by amending article Sixteen 
of the state constitution.91 After public opinion of Prohibition had changed both in the state and 
nationally, Michigan legislature again amended article Sixteen to allow for the establishment “of 
a liquor control commission, who, subject to statutory limitations, shall exercise complete 
control of the alcoholic beverage traffic within [the] state.”92 Following the ratification of the 
Twenty-First Amendment to the United States Constitution, formally ending Prohibition and 
extending nearly unfettered power to States to regulate alcohol, the Michigan Liquor Control 
Commission was created on December 15 through the Liquor Control Act of 1933.93 Finally, in 
1945, the legislature amended the act to place restrictions on bartending licenses.94  
Michigan’s legal team relied on the concept of police power — the right of a government 
to make all necessary laws intended to protect the public. They argued that the “complete 
control” specified in the state constitution afforded to the Commission regulatory power to set 
qualifications for and limitations on bartenders and bar owners.95 Therefore, they reasoned that 
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prohibiting anyone, not just women other that the wives and daughters of male bar owners, from 
being licensed as bartenders was a constitutional and appropriate exercise of police power.  
Unlike Michigan’s attorneys, Anne Davidow presented a radical argument to the Court, 
asserting that the law was an “unjust and unfair classification as to sex.”96 No one had ever 
argued before that the sexes were entitled to equal protection of the laws.97  
Specifically, Davidow claimed that “limiting the registration of bartenders to male 
persons and wives and daughters of male owners was an unfair discrimination against” female 
bar owners, female bartenders, daughters of female bar owners, and between waitresses and 
female bartenders.98 Although she conceded that the state possessed the power to regulate, even 
prohibit, liquor traffic, once the state had granted the right to be licensed to tend a bar, the state 
must apply limitations equally to all individuals. To clarify her point to the Justices, she 
explained that the “proviso permits the male owner, his wife and daughter to act as bartenders in 
his business, but denies the same privilege to both the female owner and her daughter.”99 Male 
and female bartenders and owners perform the same tasks in the workplace, so they ought to be 
considered similarly situated persons. Denying female bartenders and owners the same rights as 
their male counterparts, then, is “an instance of unjust discrimination against persons similarly 
situated in the same business, in the same relation to the purpose of the statute,” and a violation 
of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.100 Although novel and 
revolutionary, the crux of Davidow’s argument was simple.  
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Still, the Justices sided with Michigan to uphold the law in a six-to-three decision. Justice 
Felix Frankfurter authored the majority opinion on behalf of the Court. He agreed with Michigan 
that the state could “beyond question, forbid all women from working behind a bar” as an 
appropriate exercise of its police power to regulate liquor traffic.101 Thus, in the opinion of the 
Court, the 1945 amendment was not a violation of the equal protection clause.  
Recognizing that “Michigan cannot play favorites among women without rhyme or 
reason,” Frankfurter explained the Court’s position.102 The Court held that the Michigan law 
passed the rational basis test because of its legislative intent. Contemporary thought was 
suspicious of bartending women, fearing that they would promote immorality and other societal 
problems. The state may keep women from being bartenders in an effort to eliminate or reduce 
these issues.103 Moreover, the Justices were convinced that Michigan legislators believed 
“oversight assured through ownership of a bar by a barmaid’s husband or father minimized the 
hazards that may confront a barmaid without such protecting oversight.”104 Evaluating combined 
desires to preserve morality and lessen dangers through male supervision, the Court concluded 
that Michigan had a legitimate governmental interest, and thus the discrimination was “not 
without basis in reason.”105 
However, Frankfurter’s tone undermined the logic of the opinion. He immediately 
mocked the case with sexist language: “Beguiling as the subject is, it need not detain us long,” he 
wrote in the first paragraph and followed with a quip about Shakespearean alewives.106 He 
argued that “the Fourteenth Amendment did not tear history up by the roots,” nor did the “fact 
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that women may now have achieved the virtues that men have long claimed as their prerogatives 
and now indulge in vices that men have long practiced… preclude the States from drawing a 
sharp line between the sexes” because the “Constitution does not require legislatures to reflect 
sociological insight, or shifting social standards.”107 In Frankfurter’s mind, state legislatures 
retained the right to discriminate against women, even though their social station had improved 
significantly since the beginning of the twentieth century. Frankfurter even hinted that he knew 
“the real impulse behind this legislation was an unchivalrous desire of male bartenders” in the 
Detroit Local 562 “to try to monopolize the calling.”108 Regardless, the opinion relied on 
Michigan’s supposed desire to reduce immorality and other social ills while protecting women 
through male oversight in order. The law survived the rational basis test.  
Although the Supreme Court’s majority opinion disguised sexist lobbying as legislative 
intent, the dissenting opinions written carry greater historical value. Judge Frank Picard, who had 
served as chairman of a Michigan commission that studied the Liquor Control Commission in 
the early Forties, though outnumbered on the three-judge panel in the district court, passionately 
departed from the majority opinion. He focused specifically on Valentine Goesaert’s difficult 
situation, using it as a microcosm to illustrate the larger issue with the law’s discrimination. He 
wrote that this 
… is not a new venture for Mrs. Goesaert. She is not just now going into 
the liquor business under this new law. She started business, bought property, 
and incurred obligation under a law that permitted her to do exactly what her 
license said she could do --- own and operate a business… [H]aving granted her 
a license, can the legislature arbitrarily and unreasonably change the rules in the 
middle of the game as against her alone because she happens to be a woman 
licensee.109  
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He ended his discussion of the wrongs done unto Valentine Goesaert (and other women, by 
extension) by the state of Michigan with a poignant line: “Where is the ‘equal protection’ for 
her?”110 
Not only was Judge Picard convinced of Davidow’s radical assertion that women were 
entitled to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, but he also made his own bold 
claim. In the conclusion of his dissent, he stressed “for the reasons given and because I firmly 
believe that if this court endorses this type of discriminating legislation it opens the door for 
further fine ‘distinctions’ that all will eventually be applied to religion, education, politics and 
even nationalities. I must dissent.”111 In his last two sentences, Judge Picard compared sex, a 
class not recognized as protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, with already existing protective 
classes. Picard warned that sex discrimination jeopardized other constitutional rights, and 
equated sex with these rights.112  
Justice Rutledge, joined with Justices Douglas and Murphy, authored a dissent to the 
Supreme Court majority opinion that was even more radical than Judge Picard’s, even though 
their diction is far more tame and succinct. The Justices concluded that “the statute should be 
held invalid as a denial of equal protection,” and cited State of Missouri ex. rel. Gaines v. 
Canada and Yick Wo v. Hopkins to justify their dissent.113 Both cases were successful race-based 
discrimination challenges under the Fourteenth Amendment.114 In citing Gaines and Yick Wo, 
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Rutledge, Douglas and Murphy equated sex with race.115 This was revolutionary because the 
equal protection clause was created as a Reconstruction amendment after the Civil War to 
specifically protect the African-American population. Doing so, the footnote suggests that sex, 
like race, should be a protected class.  
On paper, the Goesaert decision further curtailed women’s rights by affirming that states 
had the legal authority through police power to discriminate against women, as long as they 
could demonstrate a legitimate governmental interest in doing so. Just like Brandeis had on 
behalf of Oregon in Muller, Michigan’s legal team successfully argued that prohibiting (most) 
women from bartending protected women and was good for society at large.  However, this low 
point for sex equality under the law is not what makes Goesaert significant.  
Despite losing to the Michigan Liquor Control Commission in the Supreme Court, the 
class action suit brought by Valentine and Margaret Goesaert, Caroline McMahon, Gertrude 
Nadroski, and the twenty-four other plaintiffs marked a turning point for sex-based 
discrimination laws.116 Anne Davidow presented a radical but incredibly simple argument: the 
1945 amendment to the Liquor Control Act of 1933 unfairly and arbitrarily discriminated against 
female bartenders and bar owners. Although she lost the case and was the first to make this 
claim, she convinced a district court judge and three Supreme Court Justices that both sexes, 
namely women, were entitled to the equal protection of laws under the Fourteenth Amendment.  
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In their dissents, these judges strengthened this notion by equating sex with race. They stressed 
the intent found at the heart of the equal protection clause: to ensure rights for all. Davidow, 
Picard, Rutledge, Douglas, and Murphy used Goesaert v. Cleary to push the method courts used 
to evaluate sex-based discrimination cases away from the rational basis test. They were at the 
forefront of a movement that would come to fruition in the 1970s.  
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CHAPTER II 
 “THE TURNING POINT” AND RUTH BADER GINSBURG 
 
During the early 1970s, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and her husband, Marty, both worked after 
dinner in their New York City apartment. Ruth, a professor at Rutgers Law School, graded 
papers and prepared for class while tax lawyer Marty worked on his cases. The industrious 
couple rarely interrupted one another’s work, but when Marty stumbled across Tax Court 
advance sheets for litigant Charles E. Moritz, he went to Ruth. After he handed her the sheets, 
“Ruth replied with a warm and friendly snarl, ‘I don’t read tax cases.’”117 Marty insisted that she 
read this one.118  
 Charles Moritz had been denied a $600 deduction for caring for his dependent mother 
under §214 of the Internal Revenue Code. The statute awards a deduction to any woman 
(divorced, widowed, or single), married couple, widowed man, or divorced man taxpayer with a 
dependent. Moritz, however, was a single man who had never married. Viewing deductions as a 
“matter of legislative grace,” the Tax Court found that he did not qualify for the deduction.119 
After quickly perusing the advance sheets, Ruth went to Marty’s room, and joyfully said “Let’s 
take it!”120  
  Ruth and Marty Ginsburg worked as co-counsel on the Tenth circuit appeal for Moritz v. 
Commissioner. It was Ruth’s first sex-based discrimination case of many. In a speech he wrote 
just before his death, Marty jokingly took credit for what came to follow: “As you can see, in 
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bringing those Tax Court advance sheets to Ruth’s big room forty years ago, I changed history. 
For the better. And, I shall claim, thereby rendered a significant service to the nation.”121 In 
reality, he knew Ruth was more than worthy of all the credit; Marty simply wanted to express his 
pride in being involved in one of the first steps of his wife’s monumental work. 
 Marty brought the tax advance sheets to Ruth at a pivotal hour. The Women’s movement 
had reached a gained significant attention and power. In the decade prior, government 
administrations determined that women’s issues were not as pressing as complaints made them 
seem. For example, the Kennedy administration’s 1963 Commission on the Status of Women 
concluded that females were afforded adequate constitutional protection under the Fourteenth 
and Fifteenth Amendments.  Furthermore, as the campaign for African American civil rights 
grew strength and polarized the nation, the Kennedy and Johnson administrations elected to 
ignore a parallel fight for gender equality. This attitude was shared on Capitol Hill. Congressmen 
commonly took the view that the Fourteenth Amendment’s definition of citizens as “all persons 
born or naturalized in the United States” was broad enough to include women, and granted them 
equal protection of the laws.122  
 Despite this, support for women’s issues and pressure for change began to increase. Betty 
Friedan’s The Feminine Mystique awakened many women’s sense-of-self.123 Membership in 
women’s rights organizations, including the newly founded National Organization for Women 
(NOW), increased rapidly during the Sixties and Seventies. Women emerged as a bloc and 
feminism as a strong political force. Members of these organizations worked to resolve issues 
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unique to women, such as sexist assumptions about gender roles and restrictive abortion laws, 
and to promote visibility of those issues. NOW’s major efforts centered around the revival of the 
campaign for the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA).124 
 This effort began some 50 years prior. After the ratification of the Nineteenth 
Amendment in 1920, guaranteeing the right to vote regardless of sex, feminist groups shifted 
their efforts to other discriminatory practices. These included protective laws, like those 
contested in Muller and Goesaert. Alice Paul, leader of the radical National Women’s Party 
(NWP) that had pressed for a federal woman suffrage amendment, asserted in 1921 that “men 
and women shall have equal rights throughout the United States.”125 That same year, she 
proposed a sweeping bill to end sex-based discrimination on the federal level, now known as the 
ERA.126  
 The proposed amendment met intense opposition from a variety of groups and for a 
variety of reasons. Even with woman suffrage, gender roles that limited women to the domestic 
sphere persisted. Conservatives, especially those in Congress, were turned off by the assault on 
tradition.127 More importantly, liberals, socialists and progressives, including the women 
amongst them, were unable to unite in support of the ERA. Labor activist Florence Kelley 
notably rescinded her membership from the NWP because of the proposal, commenting that 
Alice Paul disillusioned supporters with “empty phrases about equality of opportunity.”128 She 
instead believed that protective legislation favoring women, particularly laws applying to labor, 
was a more expedient way to raise women’s legal status. The liberal coalition expected to 
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support the ERA divided over contradictory goals: increased labor standards and equality.129 
When the Great Depression brought economic crisis during the Thirties, President Franklin 
Roosevelt threw his full support behind existing protective labor laws, hoping to avoid offending 
labor unions and retain a workforce.130 Within a decade, opposition squashed the ERA.  
 However, labor’s principal aversion to the ERA dissipated with new legislation. In 1963 
and 1964, respectively, Congress passed the Equal Pay Act and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. 
The Equal Pay Act abolished compensation disparity on the basis of sex. Title VII prohibited 
employment discrimination on the grounds of race, color, religion, nation of origin, or sex. 
Together, these laws served to repeal all protective labor legislation, and encouraged organized 
labor to support the ERA for the first time.  
 The complete coalition of women’s rights activist and former supporters of protective 
legislation campaigned for the ERA with renewed strength in the late Sixties and early Seventies. 
Introduced every year since 1923, Michigan Congresswoman Martha Griffiths brought the 
amendment before Congress again in 1970. The House of Representatives passed the 
amendment, but the Senate wanted to edit the draft to include a provision that exempted women 
from compulsory military service. Although the ERA was tabled in Congress until the following 
year by the Senate, it did gain significant attention.131 
 Just as in the Twenties, the ERA was again met with criticism. This time, opponents 
argued not only that the ERA did not afford new protections to women and would destroy the 
moral fabric of the country, but also removed them from their place of privilege. Chief among 
these voices was Phyllis Schlafly. Her objection rested on traditional gender roles, which 
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provided women with a husband to physically protect and financially support them as well as the 
fulfilling opportunity to be a mother. In her mind, “of all the classes of people who ever lived, 
the American woman [was] the most privileged,” so the ERA was an assault on their fortunate 
positions that would degrade women and destroy the family structure.132  
 In contrast, Ruth Bader Ginsburg was an avid supporter of the Equal Rights Amendment. 
She often wrote articles and position papers that clearly articulated the need for the ERA by 
explaining the historical and contemporary legal status of women.133 Her writing also attacked 
and dismantled the views, which she coined the four “horribles,” held by Schlafly and other 
opponents.  
The first “horrible” was the fear that the ERA would bring an end to protective labor 
legislation for women. Ginsburg discredited this line of thinking by explaining that Title VII 
effectively accomplished that a decade prior. She strengthened her argument by demonstrating 
that legislatures were increasingly enacting laws that protected all laborers, not just women.134  
The second “horrible” rested upon the assumption that passing the ERA would relieve 
men from their obligation to financially support women (and children, by extension). Ginsburg’s 
response clarified that “the Equal Rights Amendment will occasion no change whatever in 
current support laws.” 135  Rather, support would be determined by the earning potential of each 
spouse and the division of household duties on a family-by-family basis.  
Between the second and third “horribles,” Ginsburg broke her list to comment on 
traditional gender roles. She directly responded to Phyllis Schlafly’s assertion that the ERA 
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would remove women from their place of privilege within the home. To Ginsburg, “the essential 
point, sadly ignored by the amendment’s detractors, is this: the equal rights amendment does not 
force anyone happy as a housewife to relinquish that role.”136 Rather, for the first time, women 
(or, more radically, men) would be free to choose whether to work or remain at home. Each role, 
she argued, would be enhanced because of that choice.137  
The third dismantling of a “horrible” addressed the draft. A ratified ERA could include 
women in the draft pool. Rather than dismissing opponents’ fears by avoiding the topic, 
Ginsburg instead shifted conversation to focus on a broader issue: women in the military 
experienced discrimination. Military women were required to meet significantly higher standards 
than their male counterparts, did not receive equal training and professional development 
opportunities, and were regularly denied benefits granted to men. Establishing gender equality 
within the military would provide women with more opportunity, which outweighed the threat of 
the draft as the Vietnam War approached its end.138  
The final “horrible” centered on concern that restrooms would no longer be separate for 
men and women. Ginsburg noted that supporters in Congress “were amused at the focus on the 
‘potty problem,’” because the Constitution already guaranteed the right to personal privacy.139 
To her, the concern was unfounded.  
In sum, Ginsburg supported the ERA because its ratification would usher in a new 
understanding of each sex’s rights and responsibilities wholly different from the rigidity of 
traditional gender roles. The new legal system under the ERA would judge each person on “the 
basis of individual merit and not on the basis of an unalterable trait of birth that bears no 
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necessary relationship to need or ability.”140 Men and women would be legal equals for the first 
time in the United States. 
Though Ginsburg was an avid supporter of the Equal Rights Amendment, her work on 
behalf of the Women’s Movement was not limited to promoting the proposed legislation. The 
intense opposition and possible failure of the amendment led her to consider other ways of 
bringing about legal equality for men and women. As a legal scholar, Ginsburg understood the 
implications of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’ claim that “judges do and must legislate:” 
Supreme Court rulings function as law.141 Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s most significant contribution 
to the Women’s Movement was her success in persuading the Supreme Court to establish a 
heightened level of review, now known as the intermediate scrutiny test, for use in sex-based 
discrimination challenges.  
 She looked to the work of Thurgood Marshall and the National Association for the 
Advancement of Colored People’s Legal Defense Fund (NAACP and LDF, respectively) for 
inspiration and a theoretical framework. Marshall understood that he could challenge existing 
laws to defeat racial discrimination by overturning the “separate but equal” doctrine of Plessy v. 
Ferguson.142 For decades, Marshall led the LDF’s strategy effort to challenge segregation in state 
professional schools. Case by case, Marshall used the Reconstruction amendments to accumulate 
an impressive number of victories before the Court, establishing precedent to end segregation in 
schools.143 His work culminated in bringing five cases, amalgamated as Brown v. the Board of 
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Education of Topeka, that finally convinced the racially-liberal Warren Court to overrule Plessy 
in 1954.144 
 Ginsburg saw the “step-by-step, incremental approach” as advantageous.145 Marshall 
“didn’t come to the Court on day one and say, ‘End apartheid in America.’”146 The Court would 
have found that request laughable. Instead, he began with law schools and universities, and “until 
he had those building blocks, he didn’t ask the Court to end separate-but-equal.”147 He worked 
his way towards Brown and the subsequent historic ruling. Marshall’s success encouraged 
Ginsburg to do the same. She modeled her strategy off of his.148 
Ginsburg’s litigation strategy was rooted in her deeply held conviction that single-sex 
laws are inherently discriminatory. Central to all of her writings as a scholar, activist and litigator 
is the theme that these laws sustain and perpetuate outdated and inaccurate stereotypes about 
women. In Ginsburg’s opinion, protective legislation claimed by Phyllis Schlafly and other ERA 
opponents as being a “privilege” was not benign, but rather oppressive.149 She often commented 
that the pedestal upon which women supposedly stand has all too often, upon closer inspection, 
been revealed as a cage. Her first major objective was to convince the Court of the cage by 
bringing “‘easy’ cases -- those that, based on their facts, appeared to be ‘clear winners.’”150 
These straightforward and simple victories were crucial to Ginsburg’s strategy of slowly building 
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precedent that would require the Court to apply a heightened level of scrutiny to sex-based 
discrimination challenges. 
An Idaho statute used to determine the administrator of an estate provided Ginsburg with 
her first softball to lob at the Court. Richard Reed, a minor, died in Ada County, Idaho on March 
29, 1967. His mother, Sally Reed, filed a petition with the county probate court to become the 
administratrix of her son’s estate. A date was set for her hearing. She and her son’s father, Cecil 
Reed, had been separated from each other for some time. Before her hearing, he filed a petition 
to be appointed as the administrator instead. The probate court then held a hearing to evaluate the 
competing petitions.  
The court decided in favor of Cecil, citing §§15-312 and 15-314 as controlling statutes. 
§15-312 designated and ranked eleven classes of eligible persons to determine who would 
become the administrator of an estate when competing claims were made. One of the enumerated 
classes was defined as “the father or mother” of the deceased, placing Sally and Cecil within the 
same entitlement class, equally qualifying them as administrators. However, §15-314 divided 
them, providing that “of several persons claiming and equally entitled (under §15-312) to 
administer, males must be preferred to females, and relatives of the whole to those of the half 
blood.”151 The probate court judge appointed Cecil as administrator, simply because he was 
male.152   
The case was eventually appealed up to the Idaho Supreme Court. Sally’s attorneys 
argued that §15-314 was an unconstitutional violation of the equal protection clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, an inalienable rights clause in the Idaho state constitution, and the Idaho 
Civil Rights Act (§18-7301) that guarantees “the right to be free of discrimination because of 
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race, creed, color, sex, or national origin.”153  In short, her legal team argued that appointing 
Cecil administrator, preferring merely his sex to hers, was discrimination without rational 
basis.154  
 Furthermore, her legal team argued that had Sally and Cecil’s individual merits and 
qualifications to administer been evaluated, the court would have appointed Sally: she had 
primary custody of Richard for the majority of his life. Shortly after Cecil sought and was 
awarded partial custody in Richard’s teenage years, Richard committed suicide with a rifle Cecil 
owned. Just as Sally had previously opposed partial custody for Cecil because she thought he 
was a bad influence, she also feared his actions as administrator. She believed her status as 
primary caregiver supremely qualified her to administer Richard’s estate.155   
Although the Idaho Supreme Court recognized the philosophical validity of 
discrimination arguments against §15-314, it decided the nature of the statute was “not designed 
to discriminate.”156 Rather, the legislature enacted the law to alleviate judges from deciding “an 
issue that would otherwise require a hearing as to the relative merits as to which of the two or 
more petitioning relatives should be appointed.”157 Additionally, the judges assumed that the 
legislature “concluded that in general men are better qualified to act as administrator than 
women.”158 Thus, the statue was “neither illogical or arbitrary,” but rational and constitutional.159 
They unanimously decided in favor of Cecil.160 
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 After losing again, Sally appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States. The 
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) took her case pro bono, and referred it to Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg. In her brief on behalf of Sally Reed, Ginsburg presented her argument about the 
negative effect of gender stereotypes in the law to the Court for the first time. The underlying 
stereotype in §15-314 was that women were well-suited for childcare, but lacked the “capacity or 
experience relevant to the office of administrator.”161 In actuality, Ginsburg argued, “[b]iological 
differences between the sexes bear no relationship to the duties performed,” as evidenced by 
Sally’s prior financial guardianship of her son.162 She continued: 
The myth that women are inherently disqualified for full participation in public 
life as independent persons is no longer acceptable. Yet this Court’s silence has 
deferred recognition by the law that women are full persons, entitled as men are 
to due process guarantees and the equal protection of the laws. The time to 
break the vicious cycle which sex discriminatory laws create is overdue. If a 
legislature can bar a woman from service as a fiduciary on the basis of once 
popular, but never proved, assumptions that women are less qualified than men 
are to perform such services, then the myth becomes insulated from attack, 
because the law deprives women of the opportunity to prove it false.163   
 
 Still, Ginsburg tried to attack the seemingly invincible myth. She believed that the 
Fourteenth Amendment could be used to make women full citizens, like men, just as the Court 
had used it to do the opposite. The first section of reads as follows:  
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without the due process of law; 
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.164  
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The phrases “all persons” and “any person” in conjunction with “are citizens” and “equal” are 
unambiguous. They were designed to be that way. A Reconstruction amendment, along with 
Amendments Thirteen and Fifteen, the Fourteenth Amendment was added to the Constitution on 
July 9, 1868. Following the Union’s victory in the Civil War, these were adopted to extend the 
rights of citizenship to former slaves.  In order to prohibit states from discriminating against 
them, it was crucial for Congress to define citizens as “[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the 
United States.”165 In her brief, Ginsburg noted that other minority groups, like the NAACP’s 
LDF led by Thurgood Marshall, successfully used this clear language and the doctrine of suspect 
classification to achieve “full equality before the law.”166  
 However, section two of the Fourteenth Amendment complicates this seemingly 
straightforward definition by introducing a gendered word to the Constitution for the first 
time.167 It was intended to overturn the Three-Fifths Clause, which stated that “other persons” — 
slaves, were counted as three-fifths of a person for matters of population, by declaring that 
representation is tied to the “whole number of persons in each State.” 168  Nevertheless, that 
gendered word — male — is repeated three times, invariably used with ideas of citizenship: 
“male inhabitants of such a State,” “male citizens,” and again “male citizens.”169 This section 
underscores the importance of the historical context of the amendment: it was designed 
specifically and only to extend citizenship to male former slaves.  
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 Supreme Court decisions from the Reconstruction era relied heavily on this interpretation 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the Slaughterhouse cases (1873), white butchers throughout 
Louisiana complained about a state-sponsored monopoly of the butchering industry in the New 
Orleans area. They felt that this economically disadvantaged other butchers in the state by 
making their occupation illegal. Their claim rested upon interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment 
and the equal protection clause as applying to all Americans, not just former slaves. The Court 
disagreed. 
 Much of the opinion underscores the relationship between the Amendment’s history and 
their interpretation of its meaning. The decision historicizes the Amendment within the context 
of Reconstruction: 
The pervading purpose found in them all [the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Amendments], lying at the foundation of each, and without which none of them 
would have been suggested; we mean the freedom of the slave race, the security 
and firm establishment of that freedom, and the protection of the newly-made 
freeman and citizen from the oppressions of those who had formerly exercised 
unlimited dominion over him… In the light of the history of these amendments, 
and the pervading purpose of them, which we have already discussed, it is not 
difficult to give a meaning to [the equal protection clause]. The existence of laws 
in the States where the newly emancipated negroes resided, which discriminated 
with gross injustice and hardship against them as a class, was the evil to be 
remedied by this clause, and by it such laws are forbidden.170 
 
Clearly, the Justices saw the Reconstruction Amendments as applying only to formerly enslaved 
peoples. They clung so tightly to this view that they doubted “very much whether any action of a 
State not directed by way of discrimination against the negroes as a class, or on account of their 
race, will ever be held to come within the purview of this provision.”171 The Reconstruction 
Court had no intention of applying the expanded definition of citizenship to women.  
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 Ginsburg recognized this, noting that “the grand phrases of the first section of the 
fourteenth amendment would have, at best, qualified application for women.”172 The second 
section and Court decisions complicated women’s citizenship status further. Unlike litigators 
who represented racial minorities (especially African Americans), Ginsburg needed to convince 
the Court to uncouple the ideas of male and citizen, and expand the definition of citizenship to 
the universal terms of section one. She found her method of attack in the doctrine of tiered 
scrutiny.  
 In her brief for Reed, Ginsburg urged the judges to abandon the rational basis test in sex-
based discrimination cases, and instead apply a heightened level of scrutiny. Although she 
recognized that “the legislature may distinguish between individuals on the basis of their need or 
ability,” she reminded the Court that “it is presumptively impermissible to distinguish on the 
basis of an unalterable identifying trait over which the individual has no control and for which he 
or she should not be disadvantaged by the law.”173 This claim referenced racial discrimination 
cases and decisions.  In addition to providing context for the Fourteenth Amendment, race also 
dominated justifications for strict scrutiny, although national origin and alienage are also suspect 
classes. The Court had already declared that because race is immutable, legal classifications 
distinguishing persons on the basis of such a characteristic are inherently “suspect” or 
“invidious,” requiring close judicial scrutiny. Ginsburg argued by analogy, drawing parallels 
between race and sex as both “are locked by the accident of birth.”174 
 Equating sex and race also allowed Ginsburg to explain how their interdependent 
histories determined the legal statuses of racial minorities (namely, African Americans) and 
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women. Scholarship demonstrates that the legal inferiority of women, believed to be dependent 
on men for protection, basic necessities like food and shelter, and happiness, provided a model 
for oppressing other groups. Regarding wives as property, as subject to corporal punishment, and 
as legally subordinate established precedent for treating other human property similarly. 
Paternalistic narratives of happy wives and slaves subsequently emerged, reinforcing the 
stereotypes.175  
 These stereotypes influenced legislation. For women, this manifested itself in 
protectionary laws, such as those challenged in Muller and Goesaert.176 The constitutional “sharp 
line between the sexes” in these cases and others, needed to be evaluated with strict scrutiny, 
Ginsburg argued.177 Like race, being female was a natural and highly visible characteristic used 
by legislatures to create classifications derived from stereotypes. If the legislative intent in these 
sex-based discriminations was akin to that of race-based discrimination, and racial classifications 
were deemed inherently suspect, ought sexual classifications be evaluated through the same 
lens? Analogizing sex and race, Ginsburg implored the Court to recognize that “designation of 
sex as a suspect classification is overdue.”178 
Using the equivalence of sex and race, and subsequently urging the Court to adopt a 
heightened level of scrutiny in sex-based discrimination challenges was bold. In doing so, 
Ginsburg and the ACLU broke from traditional methods of appellate advocacy in which lawyers 
present the least controversial argument possible to bring about the desired outcome.179 The Reed 
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brief could have simply relied on arguing that §15-314 was unconstitutional by failing the 
rational basis test. Ginsburg did employ this argument, but its inclusion in the brief reads like an 
afterthought, comprising only the final seven of sixty-eight pages.180 The primacy of the “Sex as 
a Suspect Classification” argument in the Reed brief demonstrates its centrality to Ginsburg’s 
long-term litigation strategy.  
Ginsburg’s bold argument proved successful. The Court “concluded that the arbitrary 
preference established in favor of males by §15-314 of the Idaho Code cannot stand in the face 
of the Fourteenth Amendment's command that no State deny the equal protection of the laws to 
any person within its jurisdiction.”181 The unanimous opinion, written by Chief Justice Burger, 
noted that differentiating between men and women for the sole purpose of eliminating the need 
to hold hearings as the relative merits of competing claims “is to make the very kind of arbitrary 
legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”182 
The Idaho Supreme Court ruling was reversed and remanded, requiring further proceedings to 
comply with the United States Supreme Court’s decision.183  
Chief Justice Burger cited Royster Guano Co. v. Commonwealth of Virginia (1920) to 
justify the unanimous opinion. In Royster Guano, the Court articulated a much more stringent 
version of the rational basis test than was frequently employed. Royster Guano allowed 
“classifications for the purposes of legislation,” but such classifications “must be reasonable, not 
arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having fair and substantial relation to the 
object of the legislation.”184 Although this particular form of the rational basis test was routinely 
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used to strike down economic legislation, it adapted well to arguments over sexual difference in 
which no such relationship exists. Ginsburg’s progressive argument equating sex with race made 
this stance appear moderate, inclining the Court to adopt it. Using Royster Guano to rationalize 
the Reed decision represented an increase in the level of review used to evaluate sex-based 
discrimination cases. 
The monumental decision in Reed provided an important precedent for Ginsburg 
following sex-based discrimination cases. It was the first decision that held that sex-based 
discrimination was an invidious violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Court used a 
more stringent version of the rational basis test than ever used before to evaluate a sex-based 
discrimination claim. The advances made in Reed left open the possibility of applying strict 
scrutiny in future sex-based discrimination cases.185 
Shortly after collaborating on Reed, ACLU Legal Director Mel Wulf invited Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg to co-found and serve as General Counsel for the organization’s Women’s Rights 
Project (WRP). The WRP’s mission was identical to Ginsburg’s: to convince the Supreme Court 
to end sex-based discrimination through use of the equal protection clause. Ginsburg’s position 
provided her with an arsenal of cases as well as the ability to select those with particularly 
sympathetic facts to bring before the Court. During her decade at the WRP, Ginsburg brought 
thirty-four cases before the Supreme Court: she argued as either lead or co-counsel in six, and 
won five.186 All of these built off the precedent established in Reed and employed the same 
arguments, tailored specifically to the case at bar.  
Following Reed, Ginsburg worked on two cases involving sex-based discrimination in the 
military. The first involved Air Force Captain Susan Struck, a career military nurse. While 
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deployed in Vietnam, Struck became pregnant. After her pregnancy was discovered, she was 
ordered to McChord Air Force Base in Washington for a disposition board hearing. During her 
hearing, she declared her intention to put the child up for adoption immediately after birth, and 
also stated that the leave time of sixty days was more than enough for her to recover from her 
temporary disability after childbirth. Regardless, Air Force Regulation 36-12(40) mandated that 
any pregnant woman officer be discharged from service. Captain Struck’s options were therefore 
limited to having an abortion or being involuntarily discharged. Her Roman Catholic beliefs 
prompted her to decline the abortion. The hearing concluded with the decision that Captain 
Struck was to be discharged for “moral and administrative reasons.”187 
The Washington chapter of the ACLU took her case, challenging that the rule was 
discriminatory. While working on her case, the ACLU obtained orders delaying Struck’s 
discharge. In the meantime, Struck carried the baby to term, took only her accumulated sixty 
days of leave, and immediately surrendered the child for adoption after birth, as she had 
promised. Still, the Air Force won both in the district court and the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals.188 
Ginsburg took over the case when it was appealed to the Supreme Court. Again, she 
relied upon arguments explaining that stereotypical assumptions about women and their role as 
mothers reflected in discriminatory laws. Ginsburg argued that the regulation specifically 
targeted “pregnancy, a condition unique to women involving a normally brief period of 
disability,” when no other temporary disability required immediate involuntary discharge.189 In 
fact, servicemembers who became addicted to drugs or alcohol could remain in service as long as 
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they reported their condition and entered a rehabilitory program. Captain Struck’s sixty days 
leave was far shorter than rehabilitation programs, and her medical costs were significantly less 
than treatment for drug or alcohol addictions. As a female, “Captain Struck engaged in the wrong 
kind of recreation in Vietnam.”190 Highlighting the differences between Struck’s actions and 
those of others that did not result in discharge as well as how the regulation only affected 
women, Ginsburg argued that Struck’s discharge was entirely arbitrary, and thus needed to be 
evaluated with close judicial scrutiny.191  
The Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari, meaning they would hear the case, on 
October 24, 1972.192 However, following a recommendation from the Solicitor General, the Air 
Force waved Captain Struck’s discharge. The case then became moot.193 Despite not reaching a 
decision in Struck, Ginsburg’s arguments in her brief primed the Court for another case about 
military discrimination.  
When Struck became moot, Frontiero v. Richardson became Ginsburg’s only hope for a 
progressive sex-based discrimination ruling in the 1972-1973 term.194 Lieutenant Sharron 
Frontiero joined the Air Force in October of 1968. Over a year into her four years of obligatory 
service, she married her husband Joseph. Joseph was a veteran and a full-time student at 
Huntingdon College in Montgomery, Alabama. His total expenses amounted to $345 per month. 
Except for the education provisions of the G.I Bill and the $30 he earned each month at his part 
time job, Sharron’s income solely supported both her and her husband. Sharron applied for an 
increase in her benefits to support Joseph.  
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Provision 37 of United States Code §401 granted supplemental housing allowances and 
medical benefits to all military wives, who were automatically considered dependents, regardless 
of the dependence on their husbands. Married servicewomen, on the other hand, had to prove 
that her husband relied on her income for more than half of his financial support.195 Sharron was 
denied an increase in her benefits.196 
In December of 1973, Sharron and Joseph, with the help of the Southern Poverty Law 
Center (SPLC), filed a complaint in a district court, asserting that the distinctions drawn between 
male and female service members were “arbitrary and unreasonably discriminate[d] against the 
appellants.”197 After the Frontieros lost in the district court and later on appeal in the Ninth 
Circuit, their case was appealed to the United States Supreme Court. 
An overload of cases stretched SPLC attorneys too thin, so they asked Mel Wulf if the 
WRP could file the jurisdictional statement with the Court instead. He agreed, under the 
condition that the WRP and Ginsburg would control the litigation.  
After probable jurisdiction was noted, Ginsburg began to work on a brief. She sent her 
outline to Joe Levin, the attorney responsible for the case at the SPLC. It followed the same 
format as the Reed brief, primarily urging the court to adopt strict scrutiny, and only secondarily 
arguing that the regulation failed the rational basis test. Levin disagreed with Ginsburg’s 
approach; like most attorneys, he preferred the more restrained approach Ginsburg regarded as 
an afterthought. Letters between Ginsburg and Levin indicate that they disagreed over many 
things, such as framing arguments, who would take the lead in the case, who would make the 
oral arguments, and whether or not to submit amicus curiae (amicus) briefs. When Levin 
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continued to disagree with her litigation strategy, Ginsburg decided to file an amicus brief on 
behalf of the ACLU instread.198 
Like the outline she sent to Levin, Ginsburg’s amicus brief in Frontiero was patterned off 
of the Reed brief. An entire ten-page section about the historical and legal treatment of women as 
inferior and subordinate, with only a few modifications, was transcribed from the Reed brief. 
Also like Reed, Ginsburg framed her Frontiero argument around stereotypes about women. This 
time, the brief challenged the assumption that men were breadwinners and women homemakers. 
Ginsburg used statistics to demonstrate to the court that stereotypes of women as inconsequential 
wage earners did not reflect American reality, but rather that women constituted a substantial 
portion of the workforce and contributed to a family’s economic well-being. Sharron Frontiero 
was a perfect example of such an industrious woman. 
Debunking the breadwinner-homemaker dichotomy was strategically significant. The 
regulation, on its face, seemed like it aided women by extending their husbands’ benefits to 
them. Despite this perceived advantage, servicewomen were harmed by this seemingly benign 
classification as they were not paid as much as their male counterparts to compensate. Frontiero 
clearly demonstrated to the Court how laws understood to protect or benefit one sex over 
another, like in Muller and Goesaert, actually disadvantaged women who sought to be equal to 
men in their own right. This clear example was especially important for an all-male Court 
accustomed to patriarchal views of women. 
The Frontiero brief did, however, differ in a few ways from the Reed brief. First, 
Frontiero challenged the regulation under the equal protection guarantee implicit in the due 
process clause of the Fifth Amendment, not the Fourteenth. The implicit guarantee is “of the 
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same dimension” of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, so this difference 
did little to change the substance of the argument. Second, because Ginsburg had become 
increasingly mindful of the fact that all who are oppressed are not oppressed to the same degree, 
she did not include the extensive comparison of sex and race. Third, dissimilar to her argument 
that the statute should be repealed in Reed, Ginsburg instead argued that the benefits provided to 
men should be extended to women too.  
The final difference between the two briefs is the most significant. In addition to her 
more nuanced understanding of the legal relationship between women and racial minorities, 
Ginsburg recognized the advantages of pragmatism. Hoping that the Court would use the 
precedent established in Reed to further consider the need for heightened scrutiny, Ginsburg 
introduced the idea of a middle tier for sex-based discrimination cases, stricter than rational basis 
but not as stringent as strict scrutiny. This is not to say that Ginsburg abandoned her call for strict 
scrutiny. Just as Reed included how the statute failed the rational basis test as a doctrinal 
bottomline, Frontiero proposed the middle tier as the bare minimum level of review. 
Ginsburg used language from the Reed decision to support her proposal for middle 
scrutiny in the Frontiero brief. The Court had declared in Reed that administrative convenience 
was not sufficient to justify sex-based classifications, so Ginsburg cited Reed to demonstrate that 
the administrative convenience could not support the regulation. This tactic is demonstrative of 
her incremental approach dependent on established precedent.199 
Nevertheless, the Court’s opinion provided mixed results. On one hand, a plurality 
opinion authored by Justice Brennan, and joined by Douglas, White and Marshall, recognized the 
continued historical and legal subjugation of women. By choosing words like “unfortunate,” 
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“repugnant,” and “gross,” they condemned such treatment. This disapproval transitioned into 
their monumental declaration that: 
[S]ince sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable characteristic 
determined solely by the accident of birth, the imposition of special disabilities 
upon the members of a particular sex because of their sex would seem to violate 
‘the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship 
to individual responsibility…’ And what differentiates sex from such non-suspect 
statuses as intelligence or physical disability, and aligns it with the recognized 
suspect criteria, is that the sex characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability 
to perform or contribute to society. As a result, the statutory distinctions between 
the sexes often have the effect of invidiously relegating the entire class of females 
to inferior legal status without regard to the actual capabilities of its individual 
members… With these considerations in mind, we can only conclude that 
classifications based on sex, like classifications based upon race, alienage, or 
national origin, are inherently suspect, and therefore must be subjected to strict 
judicial scrutiny.200  
 
Ginsburg had not expected Brennan’s opinion, thinking rather “that Brennan might wait -
- might hold back until there were about four cases -- and maybe the fifth time around [would] 
say, ‘Yes, now we have had a procession of cases, and can see from the collection that sex 
indeed should be openly declared a suspect classification.’”201 This was a major victory for 
Ginsburg’s campaign: she had successfully convinced four judges that sex, like race, as an 
immutable characteristic, should be examined with strict scrutiny. 
 However, Brennan, Douglas, White and Marshall formed only a plurality, not a majority. 
Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun, wrote a concurring 
opinion. Although they agreed that the regulation was unconstitutional discrimination, they did 
not agree that sex, like race, is inherently suspect, nor did they agree it should be evaluated using 
strict scrutiny. Rather, they held that the Royster Guano level of the rational basis test, as applied 
in Reed, should continue to be used to judge sex-based discrimination cases.202  
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Justice Stewart also concurred. His opinion, only one sentence long, “[agreed] that the 
statutes before [the Court worked] as an invidious discrimination in violation of the 
Constitution.”203 He too cited Reed. 
 Although the Court was divided four-to-four on the question of level of scrutiny, eight of 
the nine justices agreed that the regulation was unconstitutional. (Justice Rehnquist, recently 
appointed to the bench, was the sole dissenter.) The only consequential result of the decision was 
that the lower courts’ decisions were reversed. The regulation did not stand.  
 Brennan’s inability to attract a fifth Justice to his opinion made it apparent that the Court 
was unlikely to adopt strict scrutiny for gender classifications. In her continued efforts, Ginsburg 
accordingly adjusted her approach to coax the Court into at least enunciating an intermediate 
level of scrutiny.  
 Another key aspect of her slightly altered litigation strategy following Frontiero was the 
use of male plaintiffs. Ginsburg hoped that the all-male Court might be more sympathetic to 
men’s issues caused by single-sex discriminatory laws. Additionally, she aimed to demonstrate 
to the Court that whenever a man was deprived of something by one of these laws, similar to 
Joseph’s situation in Frontiero, that denial was rooted in a false and negative stereotype about 
women, and that “[u]ltimately discriminations [were] more harmful to women than to men.”204 
 Ginsburg found an ideal plaintiff in Stephen Wiesenfeld. His wife, Paula, died in 
childbirth, and Stephen became the sole caregiver of his son, Jason. Prior to her death, Paula had 
been a schoolteacher. She was enrolled in Social Security, and each month paid the maximum 
contribution to her account. Following Paula’s death, Stephen visited his local Social Security 
office to apply for benefits. He was granted child insurance benefits for infant Jason under 
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Provision 42 of the United States Code §402(d), but was told that he personally was ineligible to 
receive his wife’s social security benefits because §402(g) did not provide “mother’s insurance 
benefits” to widowers.205  
 Ginsburg used Stephen’s situation to explain the double-edged nature of rigid gender 
roles, leading to discrimination, that “chivalrous gentlemen, sitting in all-male chambers, 
misconceive as a favor to the ladies.”206 She argued that Provision 42 of the United States Code 
§402’s  
exclusion of coverage for a father who has in his care a child of the deceased 
insured female worker… rest[s] on the ‘arrogant assumption that merely 
because the male breadwinner/ female child tenderer stereotypes are 
accurate for some individuals the government has a right to apply them to all 
individuals-and, indeed, to shape its official policy toward the end that the 
stereotypes shall continue to be accurate.’207 
 
The statute simultaneously “devalued women’s efforts in the economic sector” and denigrated a 
man’s parental status.208  
 In Wiesenfeld Ginsburg reasoned that “upholding the gender-based criterion would 
require approval of gross sex-role stereotyping as a permissible basis for legislative distinction” 
that the Court had already denounced in Reed and Frontiero.209 However, remembering the 
Justices’ reluctance to join Brennan in regarding sex as a suspect class in Frontiero, Ginsburg 
did not call for the use of the strict scrutiny test. Instead, she urged the court to evaluate 
Wiesenfeld’s claim with “heightened scrutiny without fear of labelling.”210 
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 Seven Justices agreed with Ginsburg’s claim that denying “mother’s insurance benefits” 
to widowers violated the equal protection guarantee of the due process clause of the Fifth 
Amendment, as it discriminated by providing less benefits to families of female wage earners. 
Chief Justice Burger and Powell concurred, arguing that the line between the sexes was 
arbitrarily drawn as there was no “legitimate governmental interest [supporting the] gender 
classification.”211 Rehnquist concurred in the judgment only, as he too found no valid legislative 
purpose in restricting benefits to surviving mothers, not fathers.212 (Justice Douglas did not 
participate in either the consideration or decision in Wiesenfeld.)213 
 Justice Brennan again wrote for the Court. He adopted Ginsburg’s assertion that the sex 
classification was invalid and based on overly broad and false assumptions about both male and 
female roles in the economic and domestic spheres. He also noted that “the mere recitation of a 
benign, compensatory purpose is not an automatic shield which protects against any inquiry,” 
presumably recognizing and articulating how all sex-based discrimination ultimately harms 
women.214  
 Ginsburg’s strategy had worked. Even though the Court did not address the question of 
suspect classification in any of the opinions, “Wiesenfeld plainly applied some level of 
heightened scrutiny.”215 The court could not find any rational basis for the gendered 
classification, and its repeated inability to do so in Reed, Frontiero, and Wiesenfeld indicated that 
the established precedent in those cases prohibited it from finding anything to uphold such a 
classification.  
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 Reed, Frontiero, and Wiesenfeld are representative to Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s long-term 
litigation strategy at the Women’s Rights Project. She brought case after case before the 
Supreme Court, incrementally establishing precedent. In all of her cases she protested 
assumptions about a particular sex’s role in society, arguing that those stereotypes could 
disadvantage both men and women, but ultimately proved most harmful to women. At first, she 
urged the Court to use the strict scrutiny test when evaluating sex-based discrimination equal 
protection claims, like it did with racial discrimination. When she realized that convincing a 
majority of Justices to this position was unlikely, she made her plea more moderate, and 
proposed a middle tier that would be stricter than rational basis but not as stringent as strict 
scrutiny. Never once did she settle for simply asserting that the sex-discriminatory statutes failed 
the rational basis test; these arguments always read like afterthoughts in her briefs. Her strategy 
was successful. Reed, Frontiero, and Wiesenfeld walked the Court closer and closer to 
announcing a middle tier; they represent small, but crucial steps. Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s strategy 
and successes would culminate in the Court’s next major decision in which it finally enunciated 
the intermediate scrutiny test.  
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CHAPTER III 
 “THIRSTY BOYS” AND INTERMEDIATE SCRUTINY 
 
Carolyn Whitner and her husband, Dwain, opened the Honk-N-Holler at the corner of 
Sixth and Knoblock streets in Stillwater, Oklahoma in 1962. Home to Oklahoma State 
University, the Honk-N-Holler was college town’s first curb-service convenience store. The 
name of the store was derived from its method of operation: customers would drive up, honk, 
and holler at the attendant, who would then bring them their order.216 Carolyn spent her days 
hustling in and out of the store, to and from cars in the parking lot. As in any college town, one 
of the most frequently purchased items was beer.217  
 The Honk-N-Holler’s license to sell alcohol was listed under Carolyn’s name, not 
Dwain’s. Dwain had lost his permit to retail beer after a sale to a twenty-year-old male. Had the 
buyer been a female of the same age, the purchase would have been legal: Oklahoma state law 
prohibited the sale of 3.2% beer, non-intoxicating alcohol or “low-point beer”, to males under 
the age of twenty-one, while only outlawing its sale to females under eighteen.218 This difference 
in the age of majority between males and females was a remnant of territorial days, not 
uncommon in Oklahoma law.219  
 In light of Reed v. Reed (1971), Oklahoma (and federal) courts began to overturn these 
statutes. Fred Gilbert, a do-it-all attorney in Tulsa, litigated many of these cases.220 Lamb v. 
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Brown (1972) involved the conviction of seventeen-year-old Danny Lamb for the felony 
burglary of an automobile. Under contemporary Oklahoma law, females under the age of 
eighteen could be tried as juveniles, but males over sixteen could not; Lamb was tried and 
convicted as an adult.221 Upon appeal, Gilbert argued that the conviction violated Lamb’s equal 
protection rights guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment by differentiating between 
similarly situated boys and girls. The State of Oklahoma offered no reasonable explanation for 
the sex-line, other than the legislature “premised upon the demonstrated facts of life” that girls 
ought to receive preferential treatment.222 The three-judge panel on the Tenth Circuit determined 
that these “‘facts of life’ could mean many things,” and thus could not be sufficiently be used to 
determine if the distinction between sexes was reasonable.223 Using an approach very similar to 
Ginsburg’s, Gilbert succeeded in overturning the sex-based discrimination law. Following the 
victory Ruth Bader Ginsburg, head of the Women’s Rights Project (WRP) at the American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU), began correspondence with Gilbert. However, Gilbert’s victory was 
short lived: a 1974 decision in Dean v. Crisp reasoned that Reed did not invalidate convictions of 
males as adults retroactively, effectively nullifying Gilbert’s triumph in Lamb. Gilbert continued 
to look for male plaintiffs between eighteen and twenty years old, hoping to reverse Dean.224   
 Simultaneously, Oklahoma legislators debated the age-sex statutory classifications. The 
Twenty-Sixth Amendment, designed to establish a uniform national age of majority at eighteen, 
particularly with regard to voter eligibility, created issues for Oklahoma.225 Like the law at issue 
in Lamb, many Oklahoma laws defined the age of majority situationally, and that age usually 
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differed between the sexes. Although the Twenty-Sixth Amendment provided a national 
consensus of eighteen as the age of majority and Reed implied that the age of majority must be 
the same for men and women, the Oklahoma legislature was tasked with incorporating these 
1971 developments into their state code. 
 A war of words erupted over the application of a uniform age of majority for alcohol 
purchase. Stillwater Democrat and freshman representative Dan Draper with Tulsa Democrat 
William Poulos introduced a bill to the House of Representatives that would define the age of 
majority at eighteen for most state purposes, including buying 3.2% beer. Their Democratic 
colleague in the Senate, Bob Murphy, Sr., proposed similar legislation. Both bills ultimately 
failed to change the status quo.  
 The battle in Oklahoma’s conservative state legislature was never truly over age, but 
rather access to alcohol. Even though the Twenty-First Amendment to the United States 
Constitution ended federal Prohibition in 1933, Oklahoma continued Prohibition until 1959; 
liquor at the county level was not yet approved when the legislature met in 1972, and would not 
be for another twelve years.226 Anti-alcohol groups perceived the proposed lowering of the 
purchasing age for males from twenty-one to eighteen as lessening the restrictions on alcohol and 
an attack on their Protestant values. Anti-alcohol legislators so adamantly opposed reducing the 
purchasing age that when the Draper-Poulos bill was being debated in the House, one member 
proposed increasing the beer purchasing age to forty! A more realistic preference of the anti-
alcohol caucus was to raise the age of purchase for females to twenty-one as well. Regardless, 
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the law remained unchanged: females could legally purchase 3.2% beer at age eighteen, but 
males could not until twenty-one.227 
The Oklahoma State Legislature was also tasked with either ratifying or rejecting the 
Equal Rights Amendment in 1972.228 At first, it seemed that Oklahoma would quickly ratify the 
amendment. Two Senators, one Republican and one Democrat, filed separate resolutions to bring 
the matter to a vote on Thursday, March 23. The measure easily passed shortly thereafter; the 
only in-house fighting that occurred was over which senator (and which party) would receive 
credit. Proceedings in the House of Representatives did not go as smoothly. 
The following Monday, Oklahoma City Democrat Hannah Atkins sponsored the 
resolution to ratify the ERA. Right before the House could vote, another Democrat, C.H. 
Spearman, objected to the vote. He called for debate. Ann Patterson, wife of important 
Oklahoma politician Pat Patterson, had been lobbying the House since Monday, when Hannah 
Atkins introduced the resolution. She targeted Republican members of the House, reminding 
them of Phyllis Schlafly’s arguments against the ERA. She also stressed that an amendment to 
the United States Constitution warranted serious consideration, and should not be rushed to a 
vote when members did not yet fully understand its implications. When the matter was again 
brought up for a vote on Wednesday, March 29, Republican representatives voiced concerns that 
echoed those of Phyllis Schlafly.229 Ultimately, their concerns defeated the resolution in the 
House 52-to-36.230 Only a short week after the ERA was sent out for ratification, Oklahoma 
became the first state to reject it.  
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Ann Patterson’s efforts to defeat the ERA did not end with the Oklahoma House of 
Representatives; she became the leader of an Anti-ERA organization in Oklahoma called the 
Women for Responsible Legislation. Joined with other conservative, Christian women, she 
obtained Phyllis Schlafly’s mailing list. They began writing to and calling women in other states, 
urging them to lobby their legislators as well. Their message was simple: Women in Oklahoma 
stopped the ERA, so women elsewhere can too. Ann Patterson was “pleased” with the fruits of 
her efforts.231 By 1982, only 35 states had ratified the ERA, just three states short of the required 
three-fourths vote to amend the Constitution.232   
All of the hubbub in Oklahoma in 1972 caught Oklahoma State University freshman 
Mark Walker’s attention. Interested in politics, Mark was fascinated and intrigued by the debates 
over age of majority and the ERA within the statehouse, as well as Fred Gilbert’s related 
constitutional challenges. Walker was enrolled in a required course called Introduction to 
American Government. His instructor was his Lambda Chi Alpha fraternity brother, graduate 
student Michael “Micky” Graham. Walker regularly stopped by Graham’s office before and after 
class to talk further about the lectures. Eventually, the pair discussed the beer-purchasing age. 
Walker was so concerned with the sex-age discrimination that Graham told him, “if you feel that 
strongly about it, consult an attorney and see about filing a lawsuit.”233 
After consulting with his local congressman, Dan Draper, who declined to take the case 
because he preferred a legislative solution, Walker contacted Fred Gilbert. The pair were well 
suited for one another: Walker needed an attorney who would argue for the equality of sexes, 
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and Gilbert was actively looking for a male plaintiff between the ages of eighteen and twenty in 
hopes of reversing Dean. Gilbert happily agreed to take Mark Walker’s case, and for cheap.234  
When the two met to discuss logistics, Gilbert presented three strategies to Walker. The 
first involved filing in state court, the second in federal court, and the third required Walker 
fabricating a criminal case by purposefully violating the law. They quickly ruled out the third 
option because the penalty for violating §37-241 fell on the vendor, not the purchaser.235 
Moreover, Walker was intent on challenging the beer law as an equal protection violation under 
federal law. As Gilbert put it, “there was still a little bit of Vietnam going on, and young men his 
age were dying for their country, and to say they couldn’t go in and buy beer, but a draft exempt 
girl could just struck him as something of an outrage.”236 Gilbert agreed on the constitutional 
challenge under one condition: Walker needed a co-plaintiff, because the vendor penalty nuance 
might cast into question his standing as the plaintiff. 
In November of 1972, Mark Walker paid Carolyn Whitener a visit at the Honk-N-Holler, 
walking out of his fraternity house through a yard littered with beer cans that were purchased by 
legally-of-age sorority girls for a party the night before.237 Whitener was busy, running in and 
out of the store to wait on customers in the parking lot. She did not have much time to talk, but 
Walker waited patiently. Somewhere in between all of the honks and hollers, Walker asked 
Whitener what she thought about the beer law.  
In a 2017 interview, Whitener recalled being very vocal with her opinion. She told him 
that she thought the law was senseless. She believed that drafting and shipping young men off to 
war in Vietnam, but prohibiting them from drinking beer when they came home was unfair, like 
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Gilbert recalled Walker complaining. Additionally, Whitener thought the law placed an undue 
burden on vendors: there was no real way of telling if a girl was simply buying beer for her 
under-age boyfriend. Her concern over this particularly liability was deepened by the fact that 
her husband, Dwain, had previously lost his license. The Whitener’s depended on the Honk-N-
Holler for their livelihood, so the prospect of Carolyn losing her license was frightening.  
Walker asked for Whitener’s help. Although he was referring to her role as a co-plaintiff 
with more sure standing, amid all the hustle and bustle of her job, Whitener thought he was 
writing a term paper about the unfair law. She agreed, “always willing to help [students] because 
they had helped [the Honk-N-Holler] get started,” by being regular, reliable customers.238 When 
Walker left that day, Whitener “still thought it was a term paper.”239 She “didn’t think anything 
more about it.”240 She did not mention it to Dwain, who was out of town on business, and let the 
matter end with their conversation.241  
Months later, Dwain learned about the case in a North Carolina newspaper headline. He 
was “irate.”242 Carolyn’s name, the Honk-N-Holler, and information about the case had made the 
front page. As Carolyn recalled, “it looked like we sued everybody in the State of Oklahoma that 
was in office, all the way down to the garbage man.”243 Dwain believed that keeping a low 
profile and avoiding controversy was the best way for the small business to continue to be 
profitable. He knew personally some of the officials named in the suit. Some of the local 
politicians were customers! He absolutely did not want to sue, fearing that it would irreparably 
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damage their business.244 Carolyn expressed that she “really didn’t know what happened.”245 
Eventually, she figured it must have been related to Mark Walker. 
A few nights later, Dwain flew home to Oklahoma, still furious. Carolyn picked him up 
from the airport, and drove him back to Stillwater in “the longest car ride.”246 He lectured her the 
entire hour and twenty minutes, constantly telling her to drop the case. She recalls that something 
resonated within her during the drive. She turned to him, and said “no.”247 Carolyn, who grew up 
in rural Oklahoma as “oil field trash,” in that moment experienced a sense of awakening, just like 
Betty Friedan described in The Feminine Mystique and other women were beginning to feel 
throughout the country.248 In the 2017 interview, she explained that “it was the first time [she] 
really put her foot down and didn’t budge,” because she “figured they were equal.”249 She 
worked as much and as hard as he did, never taking a salary in twenty-five years. She was going 
to fight with Mark Walker because she believed in equality.250 
Carolyn assured Dwain that the case would be over within a short while, maybe a month 
or two. She was wrong. Normally, Oklahoma litigants might expect a case about a beer law to 
attract only local attention, but Craig v. Boren was not an average case. As legal historians R. 
Darcy and Jenny Sanbrano point out: 
The distance between Oklahoma City and Washington, D.C. has always been 
about 1142 miles. That is far enough that people in Washington, D.C. and 
Oklahoma City are not always thinking about the same things. When they do 
consider the same subject, they do not always reach the same conclusions… 
Usually great matters go forward in a way different than they would had they been 
decided by the Oklahoma legislature instead of the United States Congress. Once 
in a great while, however, it is the dynamics of Oklahoma politics and 
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personalities that give shape to a great national issue, and folks in Washington, 
D.C. are left to puzzle it out.251  
 
After losing twice in federal court, Gilbert appealed his beer law case all the way to the Supreme 
Court of the United States. Craig v. Boren would become the case that finally convinced the 
Court to enunciate a middle tier of scrutiny to evaluate sex-based discrimination challenges, the 
pinnacle of Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s long-term litigation strategy.252 
 A few things changed between the original filing in the Western District of Oklahoma 
and being placed on the Supreme Court’s docket. Mark Walker tragically passed away on May 8, 
1976, before the case reached the High Court.253 One of his Lambda Chi Alpha fraternity 
brothers, Curtis Craig, joined the case as another co-named plaintiff in 1973 at the age of 
eighteen.254 Craig had already turned twenty-one years old by the time the case bearing his name 
reached the Court, so Whitener became the only remaining plaintiff with sure standing. Most 
importantly, though, Ruth Bader Ginsburg at the ACLU’s Women’s Rights Project became a 
crucial architect of the case. 
 Ginsburg began seriously corresponding with Gilbert when the case was appealed to the 
Tenth Circuit. Gilbert faced a few serious challenges, and Ginsburg wanted to help. First, the 
case involved an apparent contradiction between the Fourteenth and Twenty-First Amendments. 
The Twenty-First Amendment, which specifies that the “transportation or importation into any 
State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating 
liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited,” transfers the power to regulate 
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alcohol to the states.255 The broad power granted to the states in the Twenty-First Amendment 
could be interpreted to overpower the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 Secondly, the district court judges had mocked Gilbert’s language in his brief. He wrote 
that young Oklahoman men experienced “the cruel denial of the physical benefits derivable from 
3.2% beer” at the hands of the State’s discriminatory law.256 Perhaps Oklahoma’s classification 
of 3.2% beer as “non-intoxicating” generated the humor. After being ridiculed, Gilbert did not 
include this in his argument before the Tenth Circuit. Regardless, the judges focused on the 
specifics of the law.257 Young men were not prohibited from drinking beer; vendors were barred 
from selling it to them.258  
 Finally, attorneys for the State of Oklahoma had learned their lesson in Lamb. They came 
prepared with extensive statistical evidence and expert testimony to try to prove that young men 
and women are inherently different. For example, they provided records that showed more men 
were arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol than were women.259 They aimed to 
demonstrate a proper governmental interest for the sex classification, instead of relying on the 
“demonstrated facts of life” that had failed them in Lamb.260  
 Along with advising Gilbert through letters, Ginsburg’s most significant contribution to 
the case in lower courts was that she submitted an amicus brief on behalf of the ACLU. Her brief 
contained her usual argument that any discrimination against men was rooted in crippling and 
false stereotypes about women. The beer law specifically was “revealed as a manifestation of 
traditional attitudes about the expected behavior of males and females, part of the myriad signals 
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and messages that daily underscore the notion of men as society's active members, women as 
men's quiescent companions.”261 She also tried to enhance Gilbert’s argument in hopes that her 
brief would be sufficient to overcome the challenges he faced. Her brief argued that age-sex 
discrimination “cannot be justified on any basis- compelling state interest, or rational basis, or 
something in between;” that the Twenty-First Amendment does not protect Oklahoma’s beer law 
from close scrutiny; and that the “statistical proof … fails to establish that the hypothesized 
legislative objective (protection of young men and the public, particularly on the road) is fairly, 
substantially or sensibly served by a 3.2 beer sex/age line.”262 
Ultimately, both the Western District of Oklahoma and the Tenth Circuit Court of 
Appeals decided in favor of Oklahoma. They determined that the arrest statistics adequately 
demonstrated a proper legislative intent for the age-sex discrimination, despite Gilbert and 
Ginsburg’s protestations.263 The only remaining option was to appeal to the Supreme Court of 
the United States.   
When the case was added to the Supreme Court’s docket, Ginsburg wrote to Gilbert to 
ask if he would like the ACLU to file an amicus brief. Gilbert responded, “I don’t invite, I 
implore your appearance as amica.”264 The amicus brief she submitted to the Supreme Court was 
almost identical to the one she submitted to the Tenth Circuit. It contained all of the classic 
elements of a Ginsburg argument as well.265 She, however, was busy with other cases, and 
allowed Gilbert to handle the oral argument. 
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Craig v. Boren was tried on October 5, 1976. Gilbert did not fare well during the oral 
arguments. Laughs can be heard several times in the audio recording of the case. The Justices 
spend roughly one-third of Gilbert’s allotted thirty minutes asking about Craig’s standing and 
whether the case was a class action. Chief Justice Burger had to prompt Gilbert to discuss a key 
case, Kahn v. Shevin (argued by Ginsburg), that provided precedent and support to his argument, 
as if he did not trust Gilbert to do so on his own. Gilbert also interrupted Chief Justice Burger 
and the other Justices numerous times, which is taboo. Moreover, he also attempted to inform 
Justice Marshall of the outcome of two cases Marshall himself litigated: Brown v. the Board and 
a case about alcohol regulation in an Oklahoma county. In his rebuttal, Gilbert even went as far 
as to talk about his own drinking skill, saying that “getting intoxicated on 3.2, let me just say 
something factually from my own experience. 3.2 is so diluted that the normal man will get 
extremely bloated on the stuff before he can get drunk. It is possible to get drunk but you have to 
force it down.”266 To top it all off, Gilbert broke professional dress codes by wearing combat 
boots to the Supreme Court.267 His performance, overall, was sub-par. 
He did, however, manage to clearly articulate the relationship between sex- and race-
based discrimination. He compared Goesaert v. Cleary to Plessy v. Ferguson, the case that 
established the doctrine of separate but equal.268 Gilbert stressed that as he read  
the Goesaert decision, it was considerably worse than Plessy… because in Plessy, 
while saying that the un-favored race would have to have its education and 
facilities and so forth separately, Plessy never went so far as to say the un-favored 
[race] could be denied these things altogether. But Goesaert went to so far as to 
say the un-favored sex could be denied these things altogether. So that is one way 
I view Goesaert is being considerably worse than Plessy v. Ferguson.269  
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In comparing Goesaert to Plessy, Gilbert echoed Ginsburg’s repeated claim that sex and race 
discrimination should be treated the same way.  
 He also succeeded in demonstrating that the arrest statistics provided as evidence by 
Oklahoma did not accurately support the purported governmental interest. He asserted that the 
statistics only show that police more frequently suspected males of driving under the influence of 
alcohol than females, not that they actually did, as conviction statistics would prove. In his 
rebuttal, he also importantly noted that the statistics dated from 1973, but the legislature met to 
discuss the beer law in 1972. He instead suggested that Protestant values and traditional gender 
roles casting girls as angels and boys as devils were the true motivation for the beer law.270 
Despite his other failures, he was able to assert that no rational relationship existed between the 
claimed governmental interest and the age-sex discrimination.  
 Luckily for Gilbert, Ginsburg presented the oral argument for another case, Califano v. 
Goldfarb, after Craig on the same day.271 During her time, Justice John Paul Stevens asked her 
about Craig. He wanted her to further explain her claim that even discrimination against males 
was rooted in an underlying, negative stereotype about women, and ultimately hurt women more 
than men.  “We heard a case this morning,” he asked, “that would not permit males to make 
certain purchases that females could. It was attacked as a discrimination against males.”272 
Ginsburg reassured him that she was familiar with Craig, in case he had forgotten she had 
authored the amicus brief and was in the room during the hearing. Justice Stevens then asked 
“[s]o, your case depends then on our analyzing this case as a discrimination against female?”273 
Ginsburg replied, “No, my case depends on your recognition that using gender as a classification 
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resorting to that classification is highly questionable and should be closely reviewed.”274 Justice 
Brennan then echoed her argument about the double-edged nature of sex-based discrimination 
ultimately harming women, as if he has finally understood and agreed: “There is always, in fact, 
a discrimination against women.”275 
 During Justice Stevens’ unusual questions about another case, in Craig, Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg was finally able to convince the Court of her view that sex-based discrimination claims 
ought to be reviewed with a test more stringent than rational basis. The decision, authored by 
Justice Brennan, explicitly states that  
Subsequent to Frontiero, the Court has declined to hold that sex is a suspect 
class... and no such holding is imported by the Court's resolution of this case. 
However, the Court's application here of an elevated or “intermediate” level 
scrutiny, like that invoked in cases dealing with discrimination against females, 
raises the question of why the statute here should be treated any differently from 
countless legislative classifications unrelated to sex which have been upheld under 
a minimum rationality standard.276 
 
The Court formally enunciated a heightened level of review for sex-based discrimination equal 
protection challenges in Craig v. Boren. This new level, the intermediate test, required that 
“classifications by gender must serve important governmental objections and be substantially 
related to the achievement of those objectives.”277 Through a case about the denial of highly 
coveted beer to fraternity brothers, Ruth Bader Ginsburg realized her long-term goal of 
establishing such a test.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
 In 1976, Craig v. Boren represented the landmark decision by the Supreme Court to 
evaluate sex-based discrimination claims using a new, heightened level of review known as the 
intermediate scrutiny test. Intermediate scrutiny, most simply put, is more rigorous than rational 
basis, but is not as stringent as strict scrutiny, and is only applied in sex-based discrimination 
cases.  On the one hand, it is like rational basis because the government must demonstrate a 
relationship between the classification and a legislative goal. Rational basis requires the 
classification to be rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest, while intermediate 
scrutiny necessitates that the classification be substantially related to achieving an important 
governmental objective.278 On the other hand, intermediate scrutiny established sex as a quasi-
suspect class, similar to race, national origin, and alienage under strict scrutiny. Also like strict 
scrutiny, a key difference between rational basis and intermediate scrutiny is that the middle tier 
places the burden of proof on the party seeking to uphold the classification.  
To survive intermediate scrutiny, governments must provide specific evidence to 
substantiate the claim of constitutionality; the burden of proof “is not satisfied by a bare 
assertion” that the classification meets the test’s requirements.279 An independent evaluation is 
also conducted by the judiciary to search for such evidence. Furthermore, to uphold the sex-
based classification, governments are required to conclusively prove that a sex-neutral 
classification would not be equally effective in achieving the important legislative objective.280 
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While these requirements seem straightforward and clearly defined, the Supreme Court 
has not applied the test consistently since 1976. Legal scholar George S. Crisci notes that the  
“pattern of decisions handed down in gender-based discrimination cases… is confusing. Some 
cases appear to employ the deferential standard of the rational basis test. Others use a standard 
requiring greater scrutiny than the rational basis test but less than the strict scrutiny test.”281 In 
addition to the Court’s inconsistent applications and decisions, the somewhat synonymous nature 
of these definitions of rational basis and intermediate scrutiny has generated confusion. For a 
relationship to be considered substantial, how strong does it need to be? How does that differ 
from simply rational? What factors divide important from legitimate interests and objectives? 
The Supreme Court has not yet provided clear answers to these questions.  
 Regardless of the uncertainty, Ruth Bader Ginsburg continues her effort to extend the full 
guarantee of equal protection to women. Her work since 1993 has been from the Supreme 
Court’s bench, not from behind its bar. The opinion she authored in United States v. Virginia 
(also known as the VMI case) was her first opportunity to speak for the Court in regard to sex-
based classifications under the Fourteenth Amendment and the appropriate standard of review.  
 The Virginia Military Institute (VMI) is a public military college for males, with a rich 
history of producing civilian and military leaders alike. This unparalleled experience prompted 
some women to seek admission to VMI, but they were refused on account of their sex. In 1990, 
the United States government sued the Commonwealth of Virginia for denying qualified and 
capable women admission to VMI, arguing that the admission policy violated the equal 
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. During the long court battle, a new program for 
women, called the Virginia Women’s Institute for Leadership, was opened at Mary Baldwin 
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College, a private school for women. The two programs did not carry the same prestige and were 
markedly different in their methodology. The federal government continued to assert that this 
alternative did not constitute equal protection. The Court sided with the United States 
government. 
 When Justice Ginsburg announced the seven-to-one opinion on June 26, 1996, she 
echoed her previous arguments about gender stereotypes and their negative effect on women. 
She also explained very clearly how the Court applied the intermediate scrutiny test to evaluate 
the case: the Justices required Virginia to prove that the “classification served [an] important 
governmental objective and that [the] discriminatory mean employed was substantially related to 
the achievement of those objectives.”282 Moreover, Ginsburg increased the intensity of the test 
by deciding on behalf of the Court that “defenders of sex-based government action must 
demonstrate an exceedingly persuasive justification for that action;” this was the Supreme 
Court’s “core instruction” in the decision making process.283  
Ginsburg’s new requirement of “an exceedingly persuasive justification” is capable of 
standing alone, and sometimes appears to function as the intermediate scrutiny test itself.284 
Emboldening the focus of the test to depend on the phrase “gave [Ginsburg] a tougher weapon to 
use in exposing benign justifications and in combating the use of generalizations about 
women.”285 Revealing those benign justifications as not a pedestal, but a cage with the 
intensified test pushed forward, once again, Ginsburg’s agenda to prohibit the pigeonholing of 
women based on broad stereotypes. She regards “the VMI case as the culmination of the 1970s 
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endeavor to open doors so that women could aspire and achieve without artificial constraints,” 
and as “one of the most personally satisfying [opinions] she has delivered in all her years on the 
bench.”286  
The path to intermediate scrutiny neither began with Ruth Bader Ginsburg at the ACLU, 
nor ended with the enunciation of the test in 1976. It is the story of women, both litigators and 
litigants, and their struggle to achieve the Fourteenth Amendment’s promise of equal protection. 
Myra Bradwell sued under the Fourteenth Amendment immediately following its ratification, 
hoping to secure equality for women during Reconstruction. At the turn of the twentieth century, 
Florence Kelley and Josephine Goldmark strived to create at least some level of protection for 
women, even if at the expense of equality. Anne Davidow revived this effort for equality by 
arguing that both men and women are entitled to equal protection. Sally Reed, Susan Struck, 
Sharron Frontiero, and Carolyn Whitener were brave enough to entrust their lives to Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg as she waged her campaign before the Supreme Court. Although she was unable to 
convince the Court to declare sex a suspect class, she did succeed in persuading the Justices to 
enunciate a heightened level of review, the intermediate scrutiny test, for evaluating sex-based 
discrimination. Now, as the most senior female Supreme Court Justice, Ginsburg continues to 
strengthen the intermediate test and fight for equality, providing aid to more litigating women.  
. 
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